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The Committee on the Regions and the




In recent years, there has been a trend toward redistribution of
state functions away from the classical nation-state: upward towards
supranational institutions, and downward towards local and regional
bodies. The growth in international organizations and arrangements
exemplifies the upward movement, while the sometimes violent disso-
lution of formerly multiethnic states and the demands for regional au-
tonomy in many others, marks the downward trend.
The European Union (EU) epitomizes the upward movement.1
The 1992 Treaty on European Union (TEU)2 created new areas of
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1. The European Union (EU) is the current name given to an evolving political and
economic institutional framework for uniting European countries organized under the Eu-
ropean Coal & Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community
(Euratom), and the European Economic Community (EEC) (the EEC was changed by
Article G of the TEU to the European Community (EC)). See JOSEPHINE Smv'v, Euno.
PEAN CoztnsNrry LAw 4-5 (1993); European Commission, Chronology of the Union (vis-
ited Nov. 3, 1996) <httpl/europa.eu.intlenfeuhistleuchron.html>. The EU is currently
composed of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, United
Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland, and Sw.'eden. Eu-
ropean Commission, EU In Brief (visited Nov. 3. 1996) <http:h'www.eurunion.org1profile1
members.htm>. In order to avoid confusion, references to the EU will represent a refer-
ence to all the Communities and their unified institutions. The EU is not a legal personal-
ity, so where possible, references to the EU in this Article that would require a legal
personality should be understood to be references to the European Community.
2. TREATY ON EURoPEAN UmNoN, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 OJ. (C 191) 1. The TEU
amended the Treaty of Rome and the Single European Act (SEA), and renamed them the
Treaty Establishing the European Community. TREATY ESTABLISHING T-E Euvr.ov ,
Cozaun-NrrY, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 OJ. (C 224) 1, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter
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competence for European-level institutions and set in motion a pro-
cess of further integration in the monetary, foreign relations, justice,
and domestic affairs arenas. The 1996 Inter-Governmental Confer-
ence, which is expected to end in mid-1997, will determine the pace
and scope of continued change.
Much has been written about the reasons behind European inte-
gration and Europe's changing nature,3 as well as about the quasi-
federal nature of the European system. However, few scholars have
focused on the fact that this centralizing movement towards a larger
regional polity has been accompanied by a simultaneous decentraliza-
tion of many governmental functions in a significant number of Euro-
pean Union member states. This decentralization or devolution
implies changes not only in domestic governance, but in the forms of
construction and operation of supranational entities like the Euro-
pean Union.
Simultaneous integration and decentralization in Europe raises a
host of new problems: How can an integration process conceived in
terms of mostly unitary states accommodate, and even benefit from,
the growth of subnational regions as political forces? 7through what
institutional mechanisms do regions, or subnational governments gen-
erally, take part in European institutions and affairs? To what extent
does the existing accommodation of regions within the European
Union make a difference in governance or policy outcomes? Can re-
gional participation serve, as its proponents argue, to decrease the
perceived democratic deficit in Europe and to bring European-level
affairs closer to everyday citizens?
This Article explores these questions. It looks at the increasingly
formal role of subnational governments in EU institutions and at their
more informal influence in day-to-day policymaking. Rather than a
two-level federal model familiar to U.S. readers, it posits that the EU
EC TREATY]. For the purposes of this Article, references to EC Treaty represent a refer-
ence to the Treaties of Rome and the SEA, as amended by the TEU.
3. See, e.g., ERNST B. HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE: POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND
ECONOMIC FORCES 1950-1957 (1958); Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe,
100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991). The original theory explaining European integration was func-
tionalism, or the idea that growing economic convergence would create a set of political
institutions to manage and direct existing economic processes. On a larger scale, growing
interdependence, globalization of economic processes, and the need to deal with global
problems such as the environment, population movements, and the threat of nuclear war
are frequently mentioned explanations for the creation and growth of international institu-
tions. See COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, OUR GLOBAL N.IGHBORHIOOD 10
(1995).
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is moving toward a model of "multilevel governance." Professor Gary
Marks has defined this as
a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at
several territorial tiers-supranational, national, regional and lo-
cal-as the result of a broad process of institutional creation and
decision reallocation that has pulled some previously centralized
functions of the state up to the supranational level and some down
to the locallregional level.4
First, this Article considers why subnational governments have
assumed a growing role in European affairs in both the ascendant
(policy formulation) and descendant (policy implementation) aspects.
Factors include a general interest in regional autonomy as a solution
to long-standing international problems, and the devolution of power
from the national to the subnational level in some major European
countries. The answer also encompasses the regions' concerns that
their newly won domestic powers would be snatched out from under
them through the back door of European integration, the call for in-
creased forms of popular participation to reduce a perceived demo-
cratic deficit, and the new attention to the "regional" in a number of
policy areas.
Second, this Article summarizes the mechanisms available in the
most decentralized states for subnational input into EU policy formu-
lation and implementation, with a view towards understanding how
these domestic arrangements have influenced the shape of European-
level participation. Third, the Article focuses on the institutional
methods devised to allow subnational governments a greater role in
EU affairs. These include the "subsidiarity" principle, other treaty in-
novations, and especially the Committee of Regions established by
Article 198 of the EC Treaty. In addition, this Article evaluates the
work of the Committee in its first year or so of operation and looks
ahead to its future within the EU. The final section analyzes the 1996
Intergovernmental Conference and speculates as to the role of subna-
tional governments within an expanded, more heterogeneous EU and,
more generally, within international governance structures.
4. Gary Marks, Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EC, in THE STATE
OF THE EUROPEAN ComsuNrrY: THE MNmASTmCm DEBATES AND BEVOND 391, 392
(Alan W. Cafruny & Glenda G. Rosenthal eds., 1993).
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H. Why Regions?
Over time, a sizable number of European Union states have
moved towards a decentralized structure. The most "devolved" states
are Germany, Austria, Belgium, and Spain. Germany emerged from
the Second World War as a federal state, with a Basic. Law that re-
served many governmental powers to the sixteen Lander, or states.5
While some of the Lander had a specific historical identity and the
division predated the Weimar republic, the federal structure was also
a response to the victorious Allies' fear of a strong central state.6 The
Ldnder participate in the federal government through the Bundesrat,
the upper legislative chamber, which must approve treaties related to
European integration, and are responsible for large areas of govern-
ance.7 Austria, newly incorporated into the EU, is organized into
Lander along the German model.8
More recently, the 1978 Spanish Constitution devolved varying
degrees of power to seventeen autonomous communities. Some are
composed of historically distinct peoples with long-standing as-
pirations to autonomy, like the Basques and Catalans; others are
closer to administrative units with no particular identity, like Ma-
drid.10 Belgium, in a number of constitutional reform.; over the last
twenty years, delegated most power over domestic affairs to a combi-
nation of regions-Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels--and linguistic
"communities.""1
Other EU member states, notably Italy and France, have also es-
tablished regional structures.' 2 Although to date the Jtalian regions
have exercised little real power, recent elections have given new impe-
5. Jochen Frowein & Michael Hahn, The Participation of Parliament in the Treaty
Process in the Federal Republic of Germany, in PARLIAMENTARY PAR77CIPATION IN 11E
MAKING AND OPERATION OF TREATIES, A COMPARATIVE STUDY 72 (Stefan Riesenfeld &
Frederick Abbott eds., 1994).
6. Paul D. Marquardt, Subsidiarity and Sovereignty in the European Union, 18 FORD-
HAM INT'L LJ. 616, 620 (1994).
7. See generally Otto Schmuck, The German Federal Experience, in SUBSIDIARITY
WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (Andrew Dutt ed., 1993).
8. ERIC SOLSTEN & DAVm E. McCLAvE, AUSTRIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 16970
(Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Foreign Area Studies Handbook Series,
1994).
9. ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN, CONSTrnrITONS OF THE WORLD 72 (1993).
10. Francesc Morata, Spanish Regions in the European Community, in THE EURO-
PEAN UNION AND THE REGIONS 115, 116-17 (Barry Jones & Michael Keating eds., 1995).
11. Liesbet Hooghe, Belgian Federalism and the European Community, in TuE EURO-
PEAN UNION AND THE REGIONS, supra note 10, at 137.
12. Michael Keating, Europeanism and Regionalism, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND
THm REGIONS, supra note 10, at 3-4.
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tus to regional parties seeking greater autonomy and even dissolution
of the Italian state.'3 By 1996, Italy's central government was touting
decentralization and regional power as centerpieces of its program.
1 4
Beginning in 1982, decentralization escalated in France and newly
formed regional governments obtained competence in areas such as
infrastructure planning and socioeconomic development.Ys Although
the central state remains the ultimate arbiter of national policy,
French regional interests play an increasingly important role espe-
cially in the formation of EU policy.16 In Portugal, the islands of Ma-
deira and Azores enjoy regional autonomy, and regionalization of the
rest of the country has been approved although not yet imple-
mented.17 Even the United Kingdom recognized the pressures for re-
gionalization in the form of "territorial management" in Vales and
Scotland, while its conservative governments centralized administra-
tive structures and removed existing powers from local and county
governments."8 Of all the EU members, only Greece, Ireland, Swe-
den, and the Netherlands have remained more or less unitary Euro-
pean Union states.
The politicians' focus on regions and regionalization parallels a
new interest among social scientists, development theorists, and
policymakers in the virtues of decentralization and local or regional
approaches. This upsurge in interest can be attributed to several dif-
ferent theories. First, a renewed acknowledgment of the role of
groups in satisfying "deeply felt needs for group identity and dig-
13. Anthony Lewis, At Home Abroad, 'A Little Dfferent. N.Y. TmES, June 21, 1996,
at A27 (interview with Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi).
14. Celestine Bohlen, Flags Flying, North Italian Secession Rally Falls Short, N.Y.
Tmms, Sept. 16, 1996, at A3.
15. Sonia Mazey, French Regions and the European Union, in THE E.D OF THE
FRENCH UNITARY STATE 132 (S. Mazey & J. Loughlin eds., 1995).
16. d at 135.
17. Armando Pereira, Regionalism in Portugal, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE
REGIONS, supra note 10, at 269.
18. In the 1980s an erosion of local authority and a centralizing movement occurred in
the United Kingdom, but this was accompanied by the growth of -'territorial ministries'
such as the Scottish, Welsh or Northern Ireland Offices." Andrew Scott et al., SubsidtariT.
A "Europe of the Regions" v. the British Constitution?, 32 J. Co!.1M oN MKT. SThlD. 47, 53
(1994). These may adapt central government legislation to local conditions and have a fair
amount of autonomy in implementation, if not in creation, of policies. Id. The Labour
Party, widely favored to become the next government, has made regionalization a pillar of
its political platform. See Andres Rodriguez-Pose, Socioeconomic Restructuring and Re-
gional Change: Rethinking Growth in the European Communiy, Ecou. GEOGP.RAPHY, Oct.
1994, at 325.
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nity"' 9 has challenged the traditional liberal emphasis on individual
rights and the liberal contractarian model of states. The current focus
on the role of groups, including ethnic, territorial, social networks, or
local neighborhoods, appears in communitarian political theory20 in
efforts to encompass group rights within human rights theories21 and
in the insistence of indigenous peoples that their collective claims be
taken seriously.'
Second, decentralization, regionalization, and autonomy have be-
come politically acceptable answers to the seemingly intractable
problems of nationalism, separatism, ethnic conflict, and threat of se-
cession. States and legal commentators, generally unwilling to counte-
nance any right to self-determination entailing a quest for statehood,
have increasingly tried to find ways short of secession that respond to
a substate group's demands.23 Increased regional autonomy, whether
solely in the spheres of language, education, religion, and culture, or
extended to political autonomy or control over land and resources, is
a preferred solution and one that may stave off the specter of ethnic
conflict.24 Jordi Pujol, President of the Autonomous Community of
Catalonia (Spain), has stated that "regionalization is the answer to the
need for citizens to express their identities within t:he European
mosaic."25
19. HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF DErERMINATION 455
(1992).
20. See generally AMrrAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RioHTs, RESPONSIBIL.
ITIES, AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA (1993); ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE
(1994).
21. See generally Patrick Thornberry, Is There a Phoenix in the Ashes?-lnternational
Law and Minority Rights, 15 TEx. INT'L L.J. 421 (1980) (discussing the relationship be-
tween minority rights and human rights); Andras B. Baka, The European Convention on
Human Rights and the Protection of Minorities Under International Law, 8 CONN. J. INT'L
L. 227 (1993) (discussing the legal protection of minorities in Europe).
22. Erica-Irene Daes, Address at the World Conference on Humen Rights, Vienna,
Austria (June 18, 1993); Establishing a Working Group to Elaborate a Draft United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, United Nations Comrission on Human
Rights, Res. 1995/32, Mar. 3, 1995, U.N. Doc. EICN.4119951C.11/Add.2; International La-
bour Organization: Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peop es in Independent
Countries (Convention 169), June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1384.
23. See generally HANNuM, supra note 19; Gregory H. Fox, Self-Determination In the
Post-Cold War Era: A New Internal Focus?, 16 MicH. J. INT'L L. 733 (1995); MORTON H.
HALPERIN ET AL., SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER (1992).
24. For a discussion of some of the issues surrounding minority autonomy regimes, see
Henry Steiner, Ideals and Counterideals in the Struggle Over Autonomy Regimes for Mi-
norities, 66 NoTE DAME L. REv. 1539, 1547 (1991).
25. Regions Urge Reform of European Electoral System, EUR. Ri'p., May 25, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, ECNews File.
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In this context, regions seem a natural level for constructing gov-
ernment: they tend to share ecological, cultural, linguistic, historical,
demographic, and political affinities. In Europe, self-defined regions
have a long history stretching back before medieval times 6 Regions,
unlike local governments, tend to be large enough to support an eco-
nomic and public service base, while avoiding the alienation from a
distant, bureaucratic "center." Strong regions also tend to support in-
tegration into multinational units. Moreover, in countries where siza-
ble segments of the population feel alienated from the national
political system, the idea of integration into a higher-level community
may be attractive because it avoids culturally threatening political de-
cisions; if the integrated entity is by definition culturally heterogene-
ous it may have a higher tolerance of or respect for cultural minorities
within it.
27
A third set of considerations arises from a cluster of current theo-
ries that stress the importance of local and regional networks and local
control over resources. These range from studies examining the role
of social networks in civil society, to bioregional approaches
stressing the importance of developing a sense of place and living
within the limits of that place2 9 to a growing recognition of local com-
munities and their control over their resources as the cornerstone of
ecologically and socially sustainable development.3 Much ecological
26. See generally J.P. MACKmrOsH, THE DEvoLrrnON OF POV.ER: LocAL DEMOc.
RACY, REGIONALISM AND NATIONALISM (1968); see also MANUEL FRAGA IRIBARPNE, SOc.
EDAD REGION EUROPA 155-57 (1973).
27. Staffan Zetterholm, Why is Cultural Diversity a Political Problem?, in NATIONAL
CULTURES AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS ON CULTURAL DJXER-
srry AND COMSION PoUciS 65. 75 (Staffan Zetterholm ed., 1994).
28. See generally ROBERT PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WoMR CIvIc TRADmoo;3
IN MODERN ITALY (1993); Andrew S. Levin, Civil Society and Democratization in Haiti, 9
EMORY INT'L L. RE-v. 389 (1995).
29. See, e.g., WENDELL- BERRY, THn UNsETrLrNG OF AMiERICA: CULTURE AND AGR-
CULTURpE (2d ed. 1986).
30. Agenda 21: The United Nations Programme of Action from Rio at paras. 18.9(c),
3.5(a), U.N. Doc. AICONF.151/5, U.N. Sales No. E93.I.11 (1993) (empowerment of local
and community groups); U.N. Conference on Environment and Development! Rio Declara-
tion on Environment and Development at principle 22, June 14, 1992, U.N. CED Doe. At
CONF. 151/5/Rev.1 (1992); Convention on Biological Diversity, openedfor signature June
5, 1992, art. 8(j), 31 I.L.M. 818; Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries
Experiencing Serious Drought andlor Desertification, Particularly in Africa at arts. 17, 19,
June 17, 1994, U.N. GAOR Intergovernmental Negotiating Comm., 49th Sess., Doe. Al
AC.241/15/Rev.7 (1994). Recent ecological discourse has moved from stressing the need to
preserve wild places to recognition that local people have a long history of living with, and
managing, their resources, and that they need to be full partners in efforts to preserve
forests, fauna, and other parts of the natural world. See Fulai Sheng, Integrating Economic
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theory decries the harms of globalization and stresses a locally and
regionally based definition of development. 31 Finally, permeating the
humanities and social sciences is a more or less conscious postmodern
rejection of "grand theory,"32 and an embrace of the local, the discon-
tinuous, and the sui generis. This rejection provides a theoretical jus-
tification for looking beyond the nation-state and its alliances to the
local and regional spaces where many forms of real power are
exercised. 3
The desire to remedy a perceived democratic deficit in the EU
also underlies the recent focus on substate, or regional, participation
in European decision-making bodies. A major topic of Community
debate in the pre, and post, Maastricht period, the "deficit" arises be-
cause the increasing power of EU institutions is not matched by con-
comitant accountability to the citizenry. Instead, the "deficit" signifies
a shift of power from elected Parliaments to executive officials. At
the same time, regulation from EU institutions has been perceived as
distant, often inflexible, and ignorant of local conditions. For exam-
ple, while in some states EU regulation of pollution standards was
viewed as lowering existing national protections to a [least common
denominator, in others it was seen as an unwarranted and anti-com-
petitive leveling-up. The extent of the gap between EU institutions
and European citizens was manifested by the rejection of the EC
Treaty in Denmark, its near rejection in France, and the later refusal
of the Norwegians to become part of an expanded EU.
The new attention to the local and regional, and to regional au-
tonomy as a strategy that diminishes conflict and enhances legitimacy,
constitutes one part of the story of European integration. The other
part is the increasing recognition in international law and policy that
states are not the only participants in international rule-making
processes. The classical view of international law as rules derived
from interactions among sovereign states has been largely superseded
by recognition that international rule-making is a multilayered process
Development with Conservation, in REBUILDING COMMUNITIES: EXPERIENCES AND EXPER-
IMENTS IN EUROPE 35 (Vithal Rajan ed., 1993).
31. See David Morris, Free Trade: The Great Destroyer, in THE CA!;E AGAINST FREE
TRADE 139, 150 (Ralph Nader et al. eds., 1993).
32. "'Grand Theory' is the belief that the primary goal of the social disciplines should
be that of seeking to construct a systematic theory of the nature of man and society."
William P. Alford, On the Limits of "Grand Theory" in Comparative Law, 61 WASH. L.
RFv. 945, 945 n.1 (1986) (quoting QUENTIN SKINNER, THE RETURN OF GRAND THEORY IN
TmE HUMAN SCIENcES 3 (1985).
33. See, eg., Michel Foucault, Two Lectures, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE 78 (1980).
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that also involves individuals, corporations, nongovernmental organi-
zations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations like those related to
the United Nations, and subnational governments. 4 In this view, the
state is the major agent in international norm-creation and rule-mak-
ing, but it is not the only player.35 In Europe, nonstate actors provide
consultations, advice, and sometimes even make law on a wide range
of issues.36 The Economic and Social Committee (ESC), created at
the outset of the European integration process to incorporate the
views of civil society-unions, employers, and professional associa-
tions-on social matters, set a precedent for the limited incorporation
of nonstate actors into the framework of European decision-making.37
The ESC must provide its opinion on Commission proposals before
the Council of Ministers decides whether to adopt legislation on the
matter's The ESC's consultative function later served as a template
for one method of integrating the regions into EU decision-making.39
III. The Effect of European Integration on Regions
The process of devolution and decentralization in a number of
European countries gave regional governments increasing control
over land use, environment, education, training, industrial develop-
ment, and a host of other policy areas. In a few cases, regional gov-
34. Richard Falk, among others, has long been a proponent of this multilaered %iew
of international society. See generally RICHARD FALK, REvrrALIZNG I T LON:L
LAW (1989).
35. Id. ch. 1.
36. For example, much European-level negotiations over labor policy has been en-
trusted to the "social partners"-labor union and employer federations-%iith the results
to be binding law. See Agreement on Social Policy Concluded Between the Member States
of the European Community with the Exception of the United Kingdom, arts. 2(4) 4
(1992). Private standard-setting bodies made up largely of industry experts routinely cre-
ate technical standards that become part of EU requirements for products. Sce Turner
Smith, Jr. & Roszell D. Hunter, International Environmental Law Developments: A Focus
on Europe, C795 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 301, 303 (1993). NGOs play a critical role as advisors on
treaty negotiations in environmental and other areas. See Phillippe Sands, Europuan Com-
munihy Environmental La,: The Evolution of a Regional Regime of Internattonal Environ-
mental Protection, 100 YALE LJ. 2511, 2521-22 (1991).
37. The ESC plays a consultative role in the decision-making process. JOSEPHINE
STErrR, TFxi-ooK ON EEC LAW 21 (1994). Its members represent a variety of sectional
interests, including farmers, workers, trade unionists, and members of the general public.
Id. When consultation is provided for in the EC Treaty, it is an essential prozedural re-
quirement; additionally, subsequent legislation may require consultation. Id. The ESC is
also entitled to advise Community institutions on its own initiative on questions affecting
Community law. Id.; see also CLuvE ARCHER, ORrAritzwG EUROPE 116 (1994).
38. STEInER, supra note 37, at 16.
39. ARCHER, supra note 37, at 118.
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
ernments began to participate directly in international negotiations
over subjects within their competence.40 In many others, autonomist
parties won control of the regional government and began searching
for ways to expand the range of control over regional resources and
services.
From the point of view of these decentralized or autonomous re-
gions, European integration was a decidedly mixed blessing. Regions
with a specific linguistic or historical background welcomed connec-
tions with a larger Europe and the possibility of creating cross-border
alliances. But at the same time, integration raised the possibility of
having their recently-won competences eroded. As the ambit of Eu-
ropean regulations, directives, and decisions expanded to cover sub-
jects within the competence of some regional governments, these
found themselves implementing and administering rules made in
Brussels.4' For example, procurement rules and technical standards
for infrastructure projects, environmental assessments, vocational
training, and a host of other regional and local functions became sub-
ject to European rules.42 Moreover, national governments often
claimed that because the rules arose in an international forum, their
implementation and legislative development belonged within the for-
eign affairs powers of the central government and not within any com-
petence held by subnational governments.n3
Thus, from the point of view of the regions, competences won
through hard-fought and delicate constitutional arrangements were
40. For example, the Flemish and Wallonian regions of Belgium participated alongside
the representatives of the Belgian federal state in negotiating a treaty on the protection
and use of the Meuse River. Agreement on the Protection of the Rivers Meuse and
Scheldt, Apr. 26, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 851.
41. The national government assumes the obligation to implement EU law within its
territory. How it does so is a matter of each state's constitutional and wrritorial principles,
and the EU does not intervene. EC TREATY art. 5. Where subnational governments are
competent under national law in the area involved, they will generally implement the Eu-
ropean legal obligation, with the national government exercising a supervisory or coordi-
nating function. CASES AND MATERIALS ON EU LAW 204-06 (George A. Bermann et al.
eds., 1993).
42. See Mazey, supra note 15, at 138-39.
43. Perhaps the most glaring example was the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
While agriculture, especially its land use and rural development aspects, was within the
competence of subnational governments in Germany, Spain, and Belgium, under the CAP
it became an EC concern. National governments then claimed the right to regulate agricul-
tural production on the federal level as part of their foreign affairs powers because the
question was now implementation of a European-level program. See W. Gary Vause, The
Subsidiarity Principle in European Law-American Federalism Compared, 27 CASE W.
RE.s. J. INT'L L. 61, 79 (1995).
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being denied through the back door of European integration. To
make matters worse, the regions had no role in the formulation of EU
policies they were expected to implement; regional representatives
had neither a voice in the Council of Ministers nor direct access to the
European Commission. Under these circumstances, it is not surpris-
ing that many subnational governments looked at a further expansion
of European-level competences with trepidation. Regional govern-
ments developed two parallel strategies to defend their newly-won
prerogatives. They sought to increase their ability to influence the
formulation of European policies at the national level, and they
sought to expand their direct influence in the institutions of the EU.
A. National Arrangements Permitting Subnational Input into
Decisions on European-Level Issues
The subnational governments of the EU member states continue
to develop both formal and informal mechanisms to ensure that they
are adequately consulted and involved in the formulation of their
state's positions within the EU. The following is a brief summary of
the mechanisms in the most devolved states. Rather than an exhaus-
tive inquiry into the national law of these states, this section focuses
on the ways in which these national mechanisms have shaped the re-
gions' demands for direct participation in EU-level institutions.
1. Germany
The German Federal Constitution grants the Lander, or states,
near autonomy in internal affairs through original legislative, execu-
tive, juridical, and budgetary competencies.r 4 The Liinder have a
voice in federal affairs through the operation of the Bundesrat, or Fed-
eral Council, a legislative body composed of representatives from
each of the Lander governments a5 The Bundesrat may veto federal
legislation that directly or indirectly affects the iinder.4b
Until recently, the federal government retained the sole right to
represent Germany at the European level and could enter into bind-
ing agreements even in matters of exclusive Liinder competence.47
The ratification of the EC Treaty provided the leverage the Liinder
44. Hans-Georg Gerstenlauer, German Lander and the European Communtly, in THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND THE RImONS, supra note 10, at 191.
45. Id at 191.
46. Id.
47. Klaus H. Goetz, National Governance and European Integration: Intergovernmen-
tal Relations in Germany, 33 J. COM.MON MiT. STUD. 91, 95-100 (1995).
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needed to force change in domestic arrangements. Changes to the
original Treaty of Rome required Bundesrat approval, and the Lander
used their veto power to push through changes at bothr the domestic
and European levels. Domestically, Germany modified its constitu-
tion in 1992 by adding Article 23, which grants the Ldnder, through
the Bundesrat, the ability to impose their views of EU law on the fed-
eral government.48 In areas of exclusive Lander competence, the fed-
eral government and the Bundesrat must agree on a joint position to
be taken in the Council of Ministers.49 Where agreement fails, a vote
by two-thirds of the Bundesrat is now binding on the federal
government.50
In all instances where the Lander are affected by EU law, the
federal government must take the Bundesrat's position into account.51
The German federal government ensures the Bundesrat and Lander
access to EU data available to other member state governments, and
the federal ministry will ask for the Bundesrat position if the
Bundesrat would have participated in a similar internally generated
act. The permanent German representative in Brussels transmits all
relevant EU materials to the Bundesrat.
52
In addition, the Constitution now requires a two-thirds majority
of both the Bundesrat and the Bundestag, or Parliament, for further
transfers of power to the EU.53 Lander representatives, may also par-
ticipate on European Council of Ministers and Commission commit-
tees where the subject or project at issue would have required
Bundesrat action in the corresponding internal activity, or where the
Lander have competence.54 They may establish permanent links to
EU institutions, and a Lander representative participates in Ger-
many's permanent mission to the EU .55 Finally, the Bundesrat may
demand that the federal government initiate proceedinigs before the
European Court of Justice in appropriate cases.56
48. Id. at 106.
49. Il
50. Id.
51. Gerstenlauer, supra note 44, at 209.
52. Id. at 203.
53. Id. at 208.
54. Goetz, supra note 47, at 103.
55. See generally Dian Schefold, La participaci6n de los Llnder aleraanes en el proceso
de adopci6n de decisiones de la Uni6n Europea, in LA ACCI6N EXTERIOR Y COMUNITARIA
DE LOS LANDER, REGIONES, CANTONES, Y COMUNIDADES AuT6ONAS 125 (Manuel P6-
rez Gonzalez ed., 1994) [hereinafter LA AccI6N EXTERIOR].
56. Only the federal government, of course, may bring a case before the Court.
Gesetz Uiber die zusammenarbeit von Bund und Undern in Angelegenheiten der
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2. Belgium
Presently, Belgium is comprised of three communities based on
the Flemish, French, and German language and culture and three
overlapping territorial regions, Flanders, Wallonia, and the capital re-
gion of Brussels? Constitutional reform throughout the 1970s and
1980s transformed Belgium from a unitary state to a federal one in
which each of the regions and communities began to enjoy its own
areas of exclusive competence- s The communities have jurisdiction
over education, culture, health, social services, and other welfare-re-
lated areas, while the regions exercise control over employment and
industry, economy, land use, environment, infrastructure, and similar
matters.59
Belgium has gone farther than any other European state in pro-
viding ample opportunities for its communities and regions to directly
participate in EU affairs. The Belgian Constitution obliges the federal
executive to inform subnational governments about proposed EU leg-
islation or policies, and to transmit proposed regulations and direc-
tives to those subnational Parliaments that have competence over the
proposed areas of legislation.60 The Belgian position in the Council of
Ministers is determined by agreement among the federal government
and the affected regions and communities; a lack of consensus,
although rare to date, results in a Belgian abstention on the matter.
61
Ministers of the appropriate subnational government may represent
Belgium before the Council of Ministers when the topic under discus-
sion is one which falls under the jurisdiction of the regions or commu-
nities. However, in that situation they must represent the position of
the entire Belgian state.
In addition, Article 128 of the Belgian Constitution provides that,
with the exception of the Brussels Capital region, regional and com-
munity executives may enact treaties within areas of their compe-
tence.62 A series of interministerial committees on different types of
Europaischen Union [Law on the Cooperation Between the Federation and Lander on
Matters Relating to the European Union], v. 3.12.1993 (BGBI 1 313) (F.R.G.).
57. Hooghe, Belgian Federalism and the European Community. supra note 11, at 139.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See DE GECOORDINEERDE GRONDWETILA CoNs'TrruTioN cOORDoNNtEiDIE
KOORDINIERTE VERFASSUNG [BELiAN CoNSTIrtUnoN] art. 168, translated in Co.-srrrtu.
nONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WoRLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds.,
1996).
61. Hooghe, Belgian Federalism and the European Community, supra note 11, at 152.
62. BELGIAN CONSTITTION art. 128.
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treaties ensures coordination among the different levels of govern-
ment in their external affairs. The King of Belgium may, in certain
cases, halt the negotiations, for example, if a region wishes to negoti-
ate a treaty with a state that Belgium has not recognized.63
3. Spain
The Spanish Constitution of 1978 devolved varying degrees of
power to seventeen autonomous communities; while some enjoy their
own taxing and spending powers, others are competent in a minimal,
although growing, number of areas.64 Certain competences belong
only to the autonomous communities and others only to the central
government.65 Many are shared, with a framework or minimum law
at the federal level filled in by the regions.66
The Spanish Constitution makes no provisions for the effective
integration of the regions into the central government's decision-mak-
ing on European affairs.67 Nonetheless, under considerable political
pressure from strong regional governments such as the Catalan and
Basque, several attempts at coordination and consultation with the re-
gions have been sketched out, although the last few years have seen
little in the way of implementation.68
First, the Law of Public Administration 69 states that when Euro-
pean institutions require information or reports from Spain, the state
must ask the autonomous community governments for information
they wish to submit on the subject. Moreover, the cental administra-
tion must take into account and reflect the interests of other levels of
63. Article 167 of the Belgian Constitution sets out the competence of the regions and
communities, with the exception of the capital region, to negotiate and enter into treaties.
Id. art. 167. Article 81 of the Special Law of August 8, 1980 contains the mechanisms for
federal oversight of the negotiation process. See generally Yves Lejeune, L'action et'r-
ieure des regions et des communaut~s beiges et leur participation d la conclusion de traltes
internationaux, in LA Acc16N EXTERIOR, supra note 55, at 493.
64. Morata, supra note 10, at 132.
65. Id. at 117.
66. Id. at 116-17, 119-20.
67. Id at 118.
68. Interview with Joaquin Llimona, Generalitat de Catalonia, in Barcelona, Spain
(Sept. 1995). In part, the problem until April 1996 was the near-paralysi!; of any new initia-
tives in light of the crisis of the Socialist government and the subsequent call to elections.
As of October 1996, it was still unclear what would happen under the government of Jos6
Maria Aznar.
69. Ley 30/1992, de 26 de Nov. 1992, de Regimen Jurfdico de las Administraciones
Publicas y del Procedimiento Administrativo Comun, cited in Oriol Casanovas y La Rosa,
La accton exterior de las Comunidades Aut6nomas y sit participaci6n en la celebraci6n de
tratados internacionales, in LA ACCi6N EXTERIOR, supra note 55, at 63.
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government in formulating its position; if it does not, it is subject to
suit.70 Second, the Conference for Affairs Connected to the European
Communities has drafted agreements establishing the manner of au-
tonomous community participation in disputes with the Commission
and at the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and has spawned an
agreement for periodic meetings of regional and national ministers in
different subject areas to fix a common position and exchange infor-
mation. A 1994 Accord on the Participation of the Autonomous
Communities in EU affairs calls for the regions to develop a common
position and provides for the central government to exercise varying
degrees of deference to the regional position depending on whether it
relates to areas of exclusive regional competence. 71 Finally, in 1994
the Senate agreed to transform itself into an organ of territorial repre-
sentation, with consultative and information-gathering functions on
behalf of the regions; this transformation is still incomplete. 2
4. Italy
At the end of the 1960s, twenty regions were set up in Italy, but
for the most part, their makeup was a question of political expediency
rather than long historical roots.73 In recent years the northern re-
gions have pressed for increased regional power, but so far this pres-
sure has not resulted in the development of institutional mechanisms
for regional participation in European affairs.
Nonetheless, some mechanisms do exist. Sectoral conferences
between central and regional governments serve primarily as informa-
tion-sharing mechanisms. A presidential decree issued on March 31,
199474 now regulates regional participation in European and foreign
70. See Luciano Parejo Alfonso, La participaci6n de las Comunidades Aut~nomas en
el proceso de adopcidn de decisiones de la Union Europea, in LA ACxON ErEpror., supra
note 55, at 65, 104.
71. Morata, supra note 10, at 116. The Spanish regions have differed in their views
over the appropriate model for incorporation of regional perspectives. Some strong re-
gions prefer a series of bilateral relationships between the central and regional govern-
ments, while others stress the need for a strong interregional coordinating mechanism that
will then negotiate with the central authorities on behalf of the regions as a group. See
Casanovas y La Rosa, supra note 69, at 45, 51. These differences have also delayed imple-
mentation of the proposed structures.
72. PABLO I REzTRE PS, COMUNIDADES AuT6NOoLAS ESrADo Y UNION EUROFA:
NuEvo PAsOs HAcIA LA INTEGRAcI6N DECENTRALIZADA 590, 611 (Barcelona, Informe
Comunidades Aut6nomas, 1994).
73. See Carlo Desideri, Italian Regions in the European Community, in THE Eup.O-
PEAN UNION AND THE REGIONS, supra note 10, at 66.
74. El Decreto del Presidente de la Reptiblica en curso de adopci6n conteniendo
normas de direccfon y coordinacfon de las actividades de las regiones en el extranjero,
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affairs. The regions may maintain direct contacts with EU institutions
and offices without informing the central government and may under-
take "promotional activities" as well as activities with international
ramifications. However, they may not participate directly in treaty-
making. In addition, the government must transmit to the regions for
their observations all proposed EU legislation, and must hold bian-
nual meetings of the State-Regions Conference dealing with EU af-
fairs.75 This conference is consultative only, however, and has no
ability to bind the government. Collectively, the conference of presi-
dents of regions may appoint a delegate (given, however, the title of
"agricultural attach6") to the Italian permanent mission in Brussels.
5. Austria
Austria, like Germany, is a federal state composed of nine
Lander.76 The Lander were early supporters of integration into the
EU but were also suspicious of the effects on their powers. They
therefore demanded and received an agreement setting out mecha-
nisms for Lander participation in formulating Austria's positions in
EU institutions.77 The agreement provides, first, that the Federation
must supply adequate information to the Lander on all projects or
proposals of the EU that might affect the Lander' interests or other-
wise be of concern.78 A unanimous vote of five Lander on a proposal,
in an area where they are competent to legislate, binds ':he Federation
to that position except under extraordinary circumstances. If the Fed-
eration is likely to invoke the extraordinary circumstances exception it
must inform the Lander as soon as possible, and in any case it must
make its reasons known. A Conference of Lander has met regularly
since 1992 to establish common positions on issues.79
In addition, Lander representatives may, but need not, be in-
cluded in the Austrian delegations to EU institutions, and may, with
Mar. 31 1994, Gazz. Uff., July 19, 1994, No. 167 (Italy), cited in Marki Valeria Agostini,
L(neas de evoluci6n de la acci6n de las Regiones italinas en el exterior y de su participaci6n
en elproceso de adopci6n de decisiones comunitarias, in LA ACCI6N EXT)RIOR, supra note
55, at 28.
75. Agostini, supra note 74, at 31-32.
76. TOM REYNOLDS & ARTURO A. FLORES, FOREIGN LAW: CURRENT SOURCES OF
CODES AND LEGISLATION IN JURISDICTIONS OF THE WORLD 7 (AALL Publication Series
No. 33, 1996).
77. Reinhard Rack, Social Legislation in the European Community and in the Member
States-A Case of Subsidiarity?, 3 CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 47, e4-65 (1995).
78. See generally Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldem, Los Lander austr?acos y la Unl6n
Europea, in LA ACCiON EXTERIOR, supra note 55, at 173, 187.
79. Id.
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the permission of the chief of the mission, speak at meetings. Lander
may also, at their own cost, have representatives act as observers at
the permanent mission in Brussels. With respect to judicial action, if a
Lander government feels that an EU action will hurt its interests, the
Federation government is obligated to bring the appropriate com-
plaint before the ECJ.80
6. Conclusions on Subnational Participation
This brief overview of the mechanisms developed in the most de-
centralized states to incorporate regional perspectives into EU deci-
sion-making leads to several conclusions. With respect to the kinds of
regional participation in European institutions, the least common de-
nominator seems to revolve around access to, and transmission of, in-
formation to and from the region to the EU. Internally, national
governments generally organize this transmission, although, as the
next section shows, much information is transmitted directly from the
EU level to subnational governments.
A second area concerns the formulation of a national position on
proposals that impact the regions either directly or indirectly. Here,
Belgium, because of the small number of regional players, relies on
direct negotiation between each region/community and the federal
government, while in the other countries, a central clearinghouse must
define a unified position of the regions. This process is most advanced
in the German Bundesrat, in contrast, Spain suffers from the lack of
any similar institution, at least until the Senate fully takes on this role.
Furthermore, only in Belgium, Germany and Austria is the decision of
the regions potentially binding on central government negotiators in
Brussels. Nonetheless, the idea of a quasi-legislative "chamber" of re-
gions, and of horizontal links among regions to develop common posi-
tions, has been central to the emerging European-level architecture.
A third form of participation is the direct inclusion or participa-
tion of regional representatives as part of a state's Brussels delegation.
Again, the German and Belgian arrangements allow for substantial
participation, while other states permit more limited access to both
the Council of Ministers and the permanent mission. In all cases,
however, contacts with members of the Commission and informal
consultations are permitted.
Analysis of "regional" representation in the EU must accommo-
date the various types, extents, and modalities of participation of the
80. Id. at 192.
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regions in EU affairs. Many countries allow little or no participation
by regions or local governments; the differences among those that do
are substantial. Thus, any EU policy regarding the regions wili have
to be flexible and allow considerable room for variations both in the
definition of a "region" and in the powers ascribed to regions by na-
tional-law.
B. Direct Access by Regions to European Union Institutions
At the same time that regional governments pushed for changes
in national law to accommodate their participation in the formulation
of national positions on European issues, they also expanded their di-
rect contacts with the Commission, the Parliament, arid, to a lesser
extent, the Council of Ministers. The results of their efforts included
the creation of a strong regional lobbying group, the Association of
European Regions, built from a host of satellite groups, as well as the
strengthening of regional initiatives in other institutions like the
Council of Europe, and the opening of a number of regional offices in
Brussels.
1. European-Wide Organizations
The Council of Europe"1 was the first pan-European organization
to recognize the role of regions: its Standing Conference of Local and
Regional Authorities of Europe (SCLRAE) was originally formed in
1961. 2 The SCLRAE is limited by the fact that its regional and local
representatives are appointed by central governments, but it provided
an early and permanent means for communication and joint work
among regions. Accords on transfrontier cooperation recognized the
role of subnational governments in concluding agreements on a range
81. The Council of Europe, established in 1949, was among the earliest pan-European
organizations formed after WWII. It was conceived as a vehicle for political integration in
Europe. Its aims include "agreements and common action in economics, social, cultural,
scientific, legal and administrative matters." Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5,
1949, art. 1(b), 87 U.N.T.S. 103, 106. The Council acts through a Comnittee of Ministers
and a Parliamentary Assembly; it includes both members of the European Union and non-
members, including those from Eastern Europe. ARCHER, supra note 37, at 57-64.
82. Resolution 61/20 of the Comm. of Ministers, Sept. 13. 1961 (Council of Eur.), cre-
ated a permanent Conference of Local Powers as a consultative and technical organ of the
Council of Europe. Regions were added as members in 1975. Resolution 75/4 of Feb. 19,
1975 (Council of Eur.). More recently, the Conference divided into two parts: A Chamber
of Local Powers and a Chamber of Regional Powers, stressing the wider and more overtly
legislative nature of the powers attributed to at least some regions within Europe. Con-
gress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (CLRAE), 1994 EuR. Y.B. (Council of
Eur.) 42-43.
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of border issues.8 3 In addition, the Council of Europe's Charter of
Local Self-Government has served to mobilize municipal and regional
governments to communicate with and organize among themselves.?4
A second pan-European organization, the Council of European
Municipalities and Regions, based in Paris, was formed in 1951. It
comprises national associations of local and regional governments in
Western Europe, although in practice it focuses on local government
issues.8 6 It works closely with both the Council of Europe and the
EU, and has argued for equal representation of regions and local gov-
ernments in European institutions.87 Periodic General Assemblies
have produced a series of influential Declarations on European
Unity.88
A third organization represents only regional, not local, govern-
ments. The Assembly of European Regions (AER) was formed in
1985 on the initiative of nine specialized inter-regional groupings '-! It
is composed of some 269 Western, Central and Eastern European re-
gions, that, at least in principle, represent elected regional legisla-
83. European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial
Communities or Authorities, May 21, 19S0, noted in 20 I.L.M. 315 (entered into force Dc.
22, 1981).
84. Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (CLRAEh. supra note $2, at
43.
85. Macedonian Press Agency, All the European Mayors Will Participate in the Confer-
ence of Municipalities and Regions to be Held in Thessaloniki in the Presence of European
Commission President, Jacques Santer, May 14, 1996 (visited Feb. 17, 1997) <httph/
vww.hri.org/MPA/latest/13.html>.
86. See Liesbet Hooghe, Subnational Mobilisation in the European Union, 19 WoRLD
Poi- 175, 187 (1995).
87. See generally C. PELLISE & E. FACo, EEC Co,.iLussION, LES ORGAN IS ATtO\3 DE
Cou TCrsV irs DECENTRALIS.S AGISSANT DANS Ls CADRE COMM1 NALvrAipE 49 (1939)
88. The latest, The XXth (Thessaloniki) Declaration, is entitled -A Europe for its Citi.
zens" and echoes many of the proposals of the Committee on Regions, dicused belov,
for strengthening the regional and local role in interpreting the principle of subsidiarity
and in achieving sustainable development. See Council of European Municipalities and
Regions, A Europe for its Citizens, May 25, 1996 (visited Feb. 17, 1997) <http:Veu-
ropa.eu.int/enlagendaigc-homeeu-doctregionfccreen.htmn>.
89. These included long-existing transborder associations like the Assc:iation of Bor-
der Regions (ARFEIAGEG), founded in 1971 by the Rhine border regions in Germany
and the Netherlands; the Working Group of the Regions of the Central Alps (Interregional
Association of Alpine Countries), which brings together German, Swiss, and Italian re-
gions; and those representing specific geographic and economic interests like the Confer-
ence of Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe, grouping the less.developed island and
coastal regions, or the Traditional Industry Regions (RETI), which includes some 20 re-
gions of the EU affected by the loss of the coal, steel, shipbuilding and other traditional
industries. See JAsoNE AsToLA MADARIAGA, PODER REGIONAL DE LA UNI6N ELI"OsA,
VAP 95-110 (Basque Gov't ed., 1995); Hooghe, Subnational Mobilisation in the Europcan
Union, supra note 86, at 187.
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tures.9° The AER, as a private lobbying group, ha; served as a
political focal point for mobilizing important regional leaders and
pressing the case for a regional presence in European affairs. It has,
at least until the recent formation of the Committee on the Regions,
served as the main unified voice for regions in European-level institu-
tions. In addition, its constituent regional groupings continue to pro-
vide a dense network of horizontal information-sharing and lobbying
on joint interests.
2. Regional Government Offices in Brussels
Regional governments also acted independently to protect their
interests against encroachment from European integration and to in-
sert themselves into the Community's decision-making processes. Fol-
lowing the early example of the German Ldnder, many subnational
governments have opened offices in Brussels-there are now some
seventy such offices.91 The offices serve a combination of functions:
they provide information on Community institutions to regional gov-
ernments and social actors, they monitor upcoming Commission pro-
posals and funding decisions, they organize meetings between regional
authorities and the relevant Community officials, and they carry out
general promotional and commercial activities. The meetings with
European officials, and the attendant publicity, are often important as
a boost for regional politicians, showing that they matter on the larger
"European" stage. Regional office staff consult regularly with Com-
mission officials without the participation, although generally with the
knowledge, of central state representatives, thereby underlining their
relative autonomy from the state delegations. Many offices also pro-
mote a "European" vision within their respective regions, publishing
summaries of EU activities and bringing speakers on European topics.
In general, the offices serve as both the "eyes and ears" of the regions
in Brussels, and as lobbying and promotional entities for the regions.
The first regional offices in Brussels generally represented those
regions with historical claims to autonomy or from countries with
strong regional structures. However, the expanding role of regions in
the EU, first in administering the structural funds and later through
90. Committee of Regions Should Be Split, Says Assembly of European Regions, EUR.
REP., Jan. 28, 1995, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, ECNews File.
91. Some 50 regional offices existed as of 1994. A.E.R., REPERTOIRE OF REGIONAL
REPRESENTATONS IN BRUSSELS (Mar. 23, 1994). Hooghe cites 70 offices by 1995, up from
2 a decade earlier. Hooghe, Subnational Mobilisation in the European Union, supra note
86, at 186.
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regional participation under the EC Treaty has caused the number of
offices to increase. From those with historical claims to autonomy or
independence such as the Basque or Catalan, the offices now repre-
sent areas with little or no historical regional identity, including some
English counties and the Spanish autonomous communities of Murcia
and the Community of Madrid. Like it or not, these areas must now
recognize and identify themselves as regions to claim the perceived
advantages of that status.
Establishment of the regional offices has led to sharp conflicts
between national and subnational governments in some states. In
Spain, for example, the Basque Office was originally established as a
"Representation of the Basque Government." 92 Madrid objected and
filed suit in the Spanish Constitutional Court, pointing to constitu-
tional provisions reserving foreign affairs to the central government. 3
The Basque Office was subsequently reorganized as a private corpora-
tion with the regional government as majority shareholder, in a pat-
tern followed by other regions. 94 In a landmark 1994 decision the
Spanish Constitutional Court found that, because Community law af-
fected competences and areas constitutionally granted to the Autono-
mous Communities, these areas had the right to independent
representation and participation in European affairs on issues within
their competence. 5
Over time the offices have developed relations among them-
selves. Relations are especially close among regions of a single State,
who tend to meet regularly, as well as among regions sharing a com-
mon border or area.96 The offices participate in dense networks of
lobbying groups and commission-or parliament-led working groups
on a range of subjects. The offices' staff have also used their technical
expertise in EU subject areas like agriculture to assume roles in policy
formulation at the Commission and Parliament level.97 All these or-
ganizations and offices have served as an often informal means of con-
92. Morata, supra note 10, at 125.
93. Manuel Pdrez Gonzalez La "Onda Regional" En Bruselas y El Ambito Del Poder
Exterior, 21 REvISA DE INsTrrucIoEs EUROPEAS [REv. INs-. Eur.1. S99, 901 (1994).
94. Id.
95. Judgment of May 26, 1994 (Gobierno de la Nacion v. Gobierno del Pais Vasco),
S.T.C., No. 1501/8S (Spain).
96. Of course, regions and local offices compete as well as cooperate: for access, for
potential funds and investments, and for visibility. See Richard H. Williams, Spatial Plan-
ning for an Integrated Europe, in THE EUROPEAN Co.msuNrry AND THE CHALLENoE OF
Tm FTrruE 344-45 (Juliet Lodge ed., 1993).
97. Interview with Marcos Ortiz, Adviser, Comunidad Aut6noma de Valencia, in
Brussels, Belgium (lay 1995).
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necting the regions to the European Union's bureaucracy and to each
other.
A final significant channel of this type is the number of Members
of the European Parliament (MEPs) who are elected by regional par-
ties or who represent regionalist sentiments in their respective coun-
tries. Although elected to represent a national, not regional,
constituency, these MEPs not only became informal channels of infor-
mation and intelligence to their regional governments, but also served
to raise issues of concern to subnational governments before the
Parliament.
The development of these region-initiated channels corresponded
with a need on the part of the EU institutions for region-level inter-
locutors. First, the increasing importance of regions as recipients of
programmatic funds under the structural funds program provided the
initial wedge for direct regional participation in EU administration.
Second, under the 1986 Single European Act (SEA) the powers of the
then European Community expanded to include a number of areas
that as a matter of national law were exclusively or primarily within
the purview of local and regional government.', In the period leading
up to the negotiation of the EC Treaty at Maastricht, these events set
the stage for the incorporation of formal mechanisms for regional par-
ticipation in the Union's decision-making.
C. The Structural Funds and the Regions
The first major regionalization of policy came through the crea-
tion and subsequent reform of the EC's structural funds. Initially, the
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), created in 1975,
served primarily to coordinate member-state aid to underdeveloped
or depressed regions. 99 The process of creating a single market in-
creased regional disparities, thus skewing development towards the
center within each state as well as among states.100 The need for a
coordinated and proactive Community-wide approach to ameliorate
98. SINGLE EUROPEAN Acr, Feb. 28, 1987, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 30 [hereinafter SEA].
99. For a fuller description, see Harvey W. Armstrong, The Role and Evolution of
European Community Regional Policy, in THFi EUROPEAN UNION AND THE REGIONS,
supra note 10, at 35.
100. Unlike the terms of the debate in the North American context, where the main
worry was the transfer of jobs from the center (U.S.) to the low-wage periphery (Mexico),
in Europe low wages in the peripheral regions have not been enough to outweigh the lack
of infrastructure, proximity to markets and a trained workforce. Thus, integration has in-
creased the gap between rich and poor areas as industry and services have located mostly
in the former. See id. at 27-32.
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these disparities became clear. So did the need to focus on regions
rather than states. Even within the wealthier states, some regions
could slip further into poverty; the Italian Mezzogiorno is the best ex-
ample. The 1986 SEA added as EC objectives, "the strengthening of
economic and social cohesion" with the aim of "reducing disparities
between the various regions and the backwardness of the least-fa-
vored regions."''
In keeping with this new mandate, in 1989 the ERDF, together
with the other structural funds, 02 began operating under a set of
objectives that prioritize help to (1) regions whose development is lag-
ging behind, (2) regions suffering industrial decline, and (3) rural ar-
eas, with the regions to be favored decided by Community-set
criteria.10 3 For the 1994-1999 period, the amount allocated to struc-
tural funds increased by more than sixty percent after doubling from
1988-1994, and now accounts for some thirty percent of total EU
spending. By 1999 that sum will rise to over a third.104
The definition of the region as the appropriate unit for much de-
velopment aid led eventually to a perceived need to involve regional
and local authorities, who were closer to the ground and would be key
players in implementation, in the design of projects and plans to be
funded by the EC. In some cases, the choice of objectives was itself a
101. SEA, supra note 98, art. 130A.
102. The European Social Fund funds the retraining and migration of workers, and the
Guidance Section of the Agriculture Fund helps depressed farming areas. The European
Coal and Steel Community provides funds for retraining and new industries in coal and
steel-producing regions, and the European Investment Bank makes low-cost loans.
103. Objective 1 regions have a per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of less than
75% of the EU average; objective 2 regions are those seriously affected by industrial de-
cline; objectives 3 (combating long-term unemployment), 4 (facilitating occupational inte-
gration of young people), and 5a (speeding up adjustment in agricultural structures) are
not region-based; objective 5b goes to rural development in selected regions; and objective
6 (added later) aids regions particularly dependent on fishing. Structural funds have in-
creased from 12% of the EC budget in 1984 to 30% in 1994. Of that, objective 1 regions
absorbed 68% of the funds for the 1994-1999 period. The New Regional Programmes
Under Objectives 1 and 2 of Community Structural Policies, COM(95)111 final. See
Marks, supra note 4, at 393.
104. Marks, supra note 4, at 392. As the amount spent on agriculture declines under the
CAP reforms, this amount can be expected to increase still further, although it is, according
to most observers, still entirely inadequate to the tasks it confronts. See, e.g., Armstrone,
supra note 99, at 144. In addition, under the EC Treaty, a new Cohesion Fund targeting
the four countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) with a per capita Gross National
Product (GNP) of less than 90% of the Community average. Spain pushed bard for this
formula rather than another region-based program because it excludes the remaining two
of the three most populous poorer regions of the EU, the Italian Mezzogiorno and eastern
Germany, leaving Spain with a lion's share of the funding. Marks, supra note 4, at 393.
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product of lobbying by regional associations, as in the efforts of Tradi-
tional Industry Regions (RETI), the group representing declining in-
dustrial regions, to create and expand objective 2 of the structural
funds.' 05 Moreover, the availability of funds induced regional and lo-
cal authorities to pay greater attention to European-level politics and
policies.
The concept of "partnership" among all government levels devel-
oped as a key principle of the structural fund reforms. Henceforth,
regional authorities would play a role, together with national govern-
ments and the EC itself, in the planning and execution of regional
policy initiatives. Under the current scheme, each member state
prepares a draft regional development plan, which after consultation
and negotiation with the Commission becomes a Community Support
Framework within which project funds are allocated. 1°6 The regional
governments work directly with the Commission to identify appropri-
ate projects.0 7 Projects are then carried out by central, regional and
local governments.
"Partnership" is carried out through both regional government
participation in plan drafting in almost all the EU states and Regional
Monitoring Committees. Funds are allocated through division of the
Community Support Frameworks into a "national" and a "regional"
section, with the regional projects planned at the regional level.'08 In
Spain forty-two percent of ERDF funding is for regional projects, and
in Italy fifty-one percent.10 9 In addition to a growing role in project
105. PAUL MCALEAVY, Ti POLITICAL LOGIC OF THE EUROPEAN COMIMUNITY STRUC-
TURAL FuNDs BUDGET: LOBBYING EFFORTS BY DECLINING INDUSTRIAL REGIONS 12
(EUI Working Paper RSC No. 94/2, 1994).
106. Marks, supra note 4, at 396.
107. Id.
108. McALEAvy, supra note 105, at 16. The Regulations governing the Structural
Funds are more cautious: Article 4 of the revised 1993 Regulation states only that
Community operations shall be such as to complement or contribute to corre-
sponding national operations. They shall be established through close consulta-
tions between the Commission, the Member State concerned and the competent
authorities and bodies - including, within the framework of each Member State's
national rules and current practices, the economic and social partners, designated
by the Member State at the national, regional, local or other level, with all parties
acting as partners in pursuit of a common goal.
Council Regulation 2081/93 of 20 July 1993 amending Regulation (EEC) 2052/88 on the
tasks of the Structural Funds and their effectiveness and on coordination of their activities
between themselves and with the operations of the European Investment Bank and the
other existing financial instruments, 1993 O.J. (L 193) 8.
109. J. Scott & W. Mansell, European Regional Development Policy: Confilsing Quan-
tity with Quality?, 18 EUR. L. REv. 87, 95 (1993).
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selection and implementation, regional and local authorities partici-
pate in Regional Monitoring Committees which evaluate the progress,
implementation and financial solvency of ongoing projects. These
Committees include economic and social actors (i.e., trade unions,
chambers of commerce, environmental observers) as well as local and
regional authorities. According to one commentator, "partnership is
intended as a way of decentralizing decision-making in accordance
with the principle of subsidiarity, taking advantage of local expertise,
and meeting the priorities of local communities."
110
Despite continuing complaints from regional authorities that
"partnership" is still a vague concept,' the structural funds and their
administration became the thin edge of the wedge for regional partici-
pation in European Community structures as well as increased Com-
munity consciousness of the importance of regional and local
government. Starting in the late 1980s, the Commission had helped to
organize a series of conferences of regional representatives, both gen-
erally and for specific policy aims." 2 In 1988, based in part on lobby-
ing from the AER and SCLRAE,1 3 the Commission Directorate in
charge of regional policy (DGXVI) convened a Consultative Commit-
tee of Local and Regional authorities to help the Commission in the
design of structural funds programs and in evaluating the regional im-
pacts of other Community policies.1 4 The Committee was composed
of forty-two members, nominated jointly by the regional lobbying or-
ganizations, and was divided into a regional chamber and a local
chamber.
115
110. Jeff Kenner, Economic and Social Cohesion-The Rocky Road Ahcad. LEG, \. Is.
SUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 1, 14 (1994).
111. A study carried out by the Committee on the Regions in 1995 found that program-
mes were still constructed by central government, and that regional and loI authorities
felt their role was still inadequate at the programming stage, although they had a greater
role in implementation and monitoring. Opinion on the Role of Regional and Lon! Au-
thorities in the Partnership Principle of the Structural Funds, 1996 O.3. (C 100) 17.
112. Thus, for example, in July 1991 the Commission's regional directorate called a
meeting of the 60 regions eligible for Objective 2 funding (depressed industrial regions)
and urged them to organize themselves. McALEAVw', supra note 105, at 12.
113. See Manuel Perz Gonzalez, Algunas Observaciones sobre el Comit6 de las Re-
giones y su Funci6n en el Proceso de Construcci6n de la Uni6n Europea, 21 REv. Itsrr.
EuR. 31, 33 (1994).
114. Commission Decision SS!487/EEC of 24 June 19SS setting up a Consultative Coun-
cil of Regional and Local Authorities, 19SS OJ. (L 247) 23. The European Parliament,
four years earlier, had already proposed such a council. See Resolution on the Role of
Regions in the Construction of a Democratic Europe and the Outcome of the Conference
of the Regions, 1984 OJ. (C 127) 240.
115. Id. arts. 3.1,3.2,4. See ImGo BULLAiN L6PEZ, LAS REGIONEs AUrrJO.%o/!.s DE LA
Cow.iNIDAD EUROPEA Y SU PARTICIPACI6N EN EL PROCESO DE INTEGRACiON 72 (IVAP,
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The Consultative Committee met at the Commission's request,
creating greater cohesion among regional authorities from different
states and providing a direct link from regional governments into the
Commission bureaucracy. Other Directorates, notably the Environ-
ment Directorate (DGXI), also began to convene similar informal
working groups." 6 These regional representative consultative groups
showed both sides the usefulness of dialogue; they also convinced the
regional organizations that a more self-directed structure with broader
consultative abilities was necessary and helped set the stage for future
reforms.
D. Expansion of the regional aspects of other EC policies
Over time, and especially after 1992, a number of other areas of
EU policy have begun to reflect this expanded consciousness of the
importance of regions and regional-level actors. Employment policy
now emphasizes the role of territorially-based networks of small and
medium enterprises and the centrality of a territorial/regional dimen-
sion to creating employment. 117 Environmental policy, according to
the EC Treaty, aims for a "high level of protection taking into account
the diversity of situations in the different regions of the Commu-
nity.""' 8 The Fifth Action Programme on the Environment includes
the concept of "shared responsibility" among the Commission, Mem-
ber States, subnational and local governments and social forces,
119
with regional governments in decentralized states playing a key role at
the same level as member states in legislating, monitoring, and imple-
menting environmental policy and changing consumer attitudes. In
December 1993, the Commission hosted a conference of environmen-
tal ministers and regional political leaders to discuss the creation of
1989). The Consultative Committee was disbanded upon the creation of the Committee of
the Regions.
116. Interview with Maria Lozano, DGXI, European Commission, in Brussels, Belgium
(May 1995).
117. See, e.g., European Commission/EC DGV (EC Directorate Ganeral for Employ-
ment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs), Una Nueva Estrategia de Empleo, 15 IN.
NOVACI6N Y EMPLEO 2 (1994). See generally Patrick Smyth, Serving Up a Take Away
Menu for All Tastes, IRISH Timts, Dec. 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
ECNews File.
118. EC TREATY art. 130r.
119. European Commission Fifth Action Programme, Dec. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Envrn Library, Eurenv File.
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regional plans for sustainable development."' 0 Since then, it has met
regularly with regional environment officials, both in the context of
project approval under the structural funds121 and for joint planning of
environmental projects.
Two further areas bear mention as examples of the growing im-
portance of a regional focus in EU planning. First, the current empha-
sis on trans-European communications, energy and transport
networks is conceived largely on a regional basis, with a growing
number of projects linking regions across national boundaries.Y2 Title
XXI of the EC Treaty specifically authorizes Community action in
these areas; a Community-wide urban policy is also under discus-
sion.123 The idea of spatial planning organized by regions is gaining
currency. In 1991, the Commission published the Europe 2000 study,
advocating the creation of regional networks in communications,
transport, research and development, and similar matters that would
span parts of a number of EU states in large "arcs" of development. 124
Since then, a series of seminars, workshops, and networking among
regions have carried forward the spatial planning agenda on a regional
level.
Second, competition policy is increasingly concerned with the ef-
fects of state aids granted by regional, not national, governments. The
Commission has in the past challenged state aids granted, inter alia,
for regional development purposes or to stop the flight of local indus-
try.1 5 Establishing a coherent policy requires greater contacts and co-
120. EC Commission, Provisional Revision of the Application of the Policy and Action
Programme of the European Community in Relation to Environment and sustainable De-
velopment, COM(94)453 final at 59.
121. Interview with Raul Zorita, DGXVI, European Commission, in Brussels, Belgium
(May 1995).
122. See Williams, supra note 96, at 348, 352-53.
123. Id. at 356-57.
124. EC: Europe Documents; No. 1739 - Europe 2000 - Outlook for dte Commtmay
Territory, Agence Europe, Oct. 24, 1991 (summary of the Report adopted by the Commis-
sion on Oct. 16, 1991), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, ECNews File.
125. Case C-351/88, Laboratori Bruneau Srl. v. Unita Sanitaria Locale RM124 D
Monterotondo, 1991 E.C.R. 1-3641, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 707 (1991) (clause in Italian law that
required all public bodies to obtain at least 30%" of their contracts from enterprises estab-
lished in the Mezzogiorno as a way of stimulating regional development violated Article 30
of the Treaty and could not be justified as state aid); Joined cases C-324190 and C-341190,
Federal Republic of Germany and Pleuger Worthington GmbH v. Commission of the Eu-
ropean Communities, 1994 E.C.Rt 1-1173, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 521 (1994) (aid granted by the
city of Hamburg to prevent exodus of firms to other countries). See generally GEn-..Au
FERNANDEZ FARRERES, EL RtGIIEN DE LAs AYUDAs ESTATLES EN LA CO.UNI.
EuRoPEA 101-02 (1993).
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ordination between regional authorities and the Commission.
Combined, these developments have increased the visibility and
weight of subnational governments within the Community. The 1992
Maastricht reforms presented the opportunity to push the regional
agenda forward.
IV. The Regions in the Treaty of European Union
Negotiations for the 1992 Treaty of European Union took place
in the context, described above, of devolved government in a number
of important states, a perception of "democratic deficit" within Com-
munity institutions and the concomitant distrust of governance from
Brussels, and concern over the continuing destabilizing and centraliz-
ing effects of the single market. Several of the Maastricht provisions
contemplate a larger role for subnational authorities.
A. Subsidiarity
One of the most remarked-upon aspects of the EC Treaty is the
official inclusion of the concept of subsidiarity. 126 Article 3b of the
Treaty reads:
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred
upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it
therein .... In areas which do not fall under its exclusive compe-
tence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member
States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
127
Thus, as an action criterion in cases of concurrent competence,
higher levels of government should only do what lower levels cannot
do as well; conversely, higher levels should do what lower levels can-
not accomplish as well.'28 This general rule is to help the Community
institutions to decide whether and how to act, and when action can
best be left to the Member States. It can as easily, however, be ex-
tended to higher and lower levels within each Member State-that is,
126. See, e.g., Vause, supra note 43; George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Scriously:
Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 332
(1994) [hereinafter Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously]; Marquarc t, supra note 6, at
620; Nicholas Emiliou, Subsidiarity: An Effective Barrier Against "The Enterprises ofAmbl-
lion?", 17 EUR. L. REv. 383 (1992).
127. EC TREATY art. 3b.
128. See Vause, supra note 43, at 65.
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to stand by analogy for the proposition that regional governments
should act where there is no reason to think national governments will
do a better job.
First expressed in Catholic social doctrine of the early twentieth
century, subsidiarity represented the ideal relationship between the
individual and society.' 29 Germany first used the concept politically
to describe its federal system, in which all power was presumed to lie
with the Ldnder unless explicitly granted to the central authority.',
The concept made its way into the EC Treaty based on two different
motivations: As discussed, the German Lander, worried about the
erosion of their competences in the integration process, used their
power (through the Bundesrat) to block adoption of the Treaty unless
it incorporated the concept, which they saw as limiting the power of
Bonn, not Brussels.' On the other hand, in a number of states, nota-
bly the UK and Denmark, subsidiarity was a convenient method to
limit perceived excessive growth in the Commission's powers at the
expense of the Member States. 32 The crisis precipitated by Den-
mark's rejection of the Treaty in June 1992 led EU supporters to seize
upon the subsidiarity principle to reassure voters that EU power could
not continue to increase unfettered. 3 -
Subsidiarity has long been a part of EC law. The Treaty of Rome
in Article 3(h) declared that the harmonization of Member State laws
should occur "only to the extent required for the proper functioning
129. In his Papal Encyclical of 1931, Pope Pius XI declared that "it is an injury and at
the same time both a serious evil and a disturbance of right order to assign a larger and
higher society what can be performed successfully by smaller and lower communities."
Bermann, Taking Subsidiariy Seriously, supra note 126, at 339 (quoting Pius XI,
Quadragesimo Anno (1931)); Marquardt. supra note 6, at 618.
130. Marquardt, supra note 6, at 620.
131. See Javier Barnes, El Principio de Subsidiaridad y las Regtones Europex, in L
CoMUNIDAD EUROPEA, LA INSTANCIA REGIONAL Y LA ORGANIZACl6N ADMZNISTRATIVA
DE LOS ESTADOS MIEM MROS 509, 516 (J. Barnes ed., 1993).
132. Scott et al., supra note 18, at 51-52.
133. Marquardt, supra note 6, at 626. The growvth of Community powers over the previ-
ous decade had taken several forms. The ECJ's recognition of the doctrines of direct appli-
cability, direct effect and supremacy, and its creation of the concepts of enumeration,
implied powers and preemption gave the Community a decidedly federalist legal basis.
Bermarm, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously, supra note 126, at 349,362. The shift from unani-
mous to qualified majority voting on a wider range of issues after 19S6 diminished Member
States' ability to scuttle unwanted legislation. Id In addition, as noted, the Community
seemed to be spreading its legislative and regulatory net ever-wvider, sometimes to an ab-
surd level of detail.
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of the common market."'" The Commission has long recognized the
Member States' superior capacity to implement Community legisla-
tion through the preference for Directives over Regulations in many
areas. 35 Moreover, in 1975, the Commission's Report on the Eco-
nomic Union introduced the notion that Community powers should
complement, rather than compete with Member State powers, and
that the Community should not interfere where Member State action
could more effectively accomplish the desired results.
13 6
Subsidiarity next appeared in the Preamble and Article 12 of the
ultimately unsuccessful 1984 Draft Treaty on the European Union.137
The European Parliament, placing the subsidiarity idea within the
context of reducing the democratic deficit, included it in several Re-
ports and Resolutions. 138 The SEA incorporated the principle only in
the area of environmental protection.139 Article 130r(4) of the SEA
states that "the Community shall take action relating to the environ-
ment to the extent to which the objectives can be attained better by
the Community than at the level of the individual Member States."
40
It soon became clear that the test merely begged the question of when
an objective could be better attained at one level or the other.
At the 1992 Edinburgh Summit, the European Council of Minis-
ters issued guidelines for EU legislation under the subsidiarity princi-
ple.141 In areas where the Union and the Member States exercise
joint competence, the issue must either have significant transnational
aspects; and/or independent action by the Member States would dam-
age a collateral treaty goal; and/or action at the EU level would pro-
duce clear benefits of scale or effectiveness. 42 Moreover, the
principle would not have direct effect so as to support judicial chal-
134. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957,
art. 3(h), 298 U.N.T.S. 4, 16 [hereinafter TREATY OF ROME]. See also Bermann, Taking
Subsidiarity Seriously, supra note 126, at 371.
135. Id. at 372. Directives, unlike Regulations, allow each Member State to determine
the manner in which they will transpose and implement Community legislation in their
domestic law.
136. Vause, supra note 43, at 63.
137. Id. at 64.
138. Barnes, supra note 131, at 523-24.
139. Regina S. Axelrod, Subsidiarity and Environmental Policy in the European Com-
munity, 4 INT'L ENr L. AFFAIRS 115, 117 (1992).
140. EC TREATY art 130r(4).
141. See Conclusions of Dec. 11-12 Edinburgh Summit, Reuter European Community
Report, Dec. 14, 1992, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, ECNews File.
142. Id.
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lenges on that basis, and it would not alter powers previously allo-
cated to the Community.
143
The Commission has explained that it will implement the princi-
ple when considering or revising legislation by justifying all future
proposals according to the Edinburgh criteria." In practice, the
Commission's legislative agenda has diminished considerably in the
last year or two, and several Directives, especially in the environment
and social policy areas, have been simplified or withdrawn. Although
no case has yet been decided, most authors agree that alleged Com-
mission or Council violations of the subsidiarity principle could be
challenged by the Member States under Article 173 of the Treaty.14
Subsidiarity constitutes an eminently political criterion leaving neces-
sarily wide discretion to the legislator." Nonetheless, German Con-
stitutional Court jurisprudence,1 47 together with the ECJ's existing
interpretations of such closely-related concepts as proportionality,148
probably provide a basis for minimal judicial control.
Article 3b as currently drafted refers only to the relations be-
tween the EU and the Member States. 49 Similarly, the listed applica-
tions of the principle to specific areas also refer only to the method for
143. Id. According to the Commission, subsidiarity merely regulates the way in which
shared competences are exercised, and does not affect how competences are allocated. Id.
pt. A, annex 1. Direct effect would allow individuals to bring a complaint of violation
before the ECJ. STERIER, supra note 37, at 314-15.
144. Id.
145. See e.g., Bermann, Taking Subsidiariy Seriously, supra note 126, at 391-95;
Emiliou, supra note 126, at 402-03.
146. This is the case because one's judgment about whether a measure comports with
subsidiarity is profoundly political in the sense that it depends on one's assessment of the
measure's merits, in addition to predicting the consequences of allowing the Member
States to act. "It is fully an exercise in speculation as well as judgment." Bermann, Taking
Subsidiarity Seriously, supra note 126, at 335. See also Daniel T. Murphy, Subsidtaniy and!
or Human Rights, 29 U. RicH. L. REx,. 67, 72 (1994).
147. The German Constitutional Court has interpreted Article 72 of the Basic Law,
which encapsulates a similar idea, leaving wide discretion to the Federal authorities, with
abuse of discretion the only limit. See Barnes, supra note 131, at 547-48. Similarly, in the
United States, federal legislation rarely treads on a state's prerogatives.
148. "Proportionality" has been prominent in Court of Justice jurisprudence. The do:-
trine generally requires that government measures (1) bear a reasonable relation to a legit-
imate governmental purpose, (2) produce benefits that outweigh the corresponding costs,
and (3) represent the least burdensome or intrusive alternative among available means.
George A. Bermann, Subsidiariy and the European Communiy, 17 HAsrS INT'L &
CoMP. L. REv. 97,111 (1993) (citation omitted) [hereinafter Bermann, Subsidiarity and the
European Community].
149. EC TREATY art. 3b.
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sharing competences at the national and EU levelsY ° Nowhere is
there a specific reference in the article, or in subsequent official inter-
pretations, of its application "downwards," i.e. to include subnational
governments. The starting point for analyzing a possible application
to regions and local governments must come from considering the
subsidiarity debate in light of Article 3a of the EC Treaty, in which the
Member States pledge "to continue the process of creating an ever
closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are
taken as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance with the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity."''
Here, subsidiarity is a substantive, normative principle, not
merely a criterion for distributing legislative function3 efficiently.
15 2
As such, it has no natural stopping point at the border of each state:
regional and local governments presumably are closer to the citizen
than higher levels. Such an interpretation would support Bermann's
contention that the "drafters' [of Article 3b] apparent purpose was to
reassure Member State populations, and subcommunities within those
populations, that the Community's seemingly inexorable march to-
ward greater legal and political integration would not needlessly tram-




Of all the Community institutions, the most impermeable to in-
fluence by subnational governments has been the Council of Minis-
ters, composed of national representatives and their staffs. At the
same time, much of the decision-making power of the Community lies
in the Council, which debates and approves legislation and programs.
Many regional governments place a higher priority on access to the
Council, as the place "where the action is," than on access to other
EU institutions. Thus, the German and Belgian regions have been
especially vocal in demanding subnational access to the Council when
it discusses and votes on issues within the competence of regional
governments.
150. Id. arts. 126, 127, 128, 129, 129a, 129b, 130a, 130f, 130r, 130u. In addition, applica-
tion of the principle might, for example, lead to preferential use of the Directive over the
Regulation, or to a preference for mutual recognition or minimum standards over harmo-
nization. All these also refer only to relations between the EU and the member states.
151. Id art. 3a.
152. See Scott et al., supra note 18, at 50.
153. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously, supra note 126, at 334.
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As a result, the EC Treaty now permits the participation of re-
gional-level ministers in Council meetings. Before Maastricht, Article
146 read "the Council shall consist of representatives of the Member
States. Each Government shall delegate to it one of its members."'' 1
After Maastricht, the Article reads "the Council shall consist of a rep-
resentative of each Member State at ministerial level, authorized to
commit the government of that Member State."15 -5 Thus, regional
ministers may commit the national government so long as they are
authorized to do so. Importantly, the minister does not represent only
her own region, but the entire State. Regional participation requires a
high degree of coordination among national regions to derive a com-
mon position as well as authorization from the central authorities and
a constitutional structure which permits such participation. Thus, the
change may only be useful to states like Germany, which through the
Bundesrat has a well-developed coordination mechanism for the
Ldnder, or Belgium, where only two or three authorities are involved
and an extensive consultation system is already in place." 6 Given
central government resistance as well as the lack of adequate coordi-
nating mechanisms among the larger number of Spanish or Italian re-
gions, for example, their use of Article 146 will probably be limited.
C. The Committee of the Regions
The most concrete expression of regional input as a result of the
EC Treaty is the addition of Chapter 4, Article 198a-c setting up a
formal consultative body of regional and local representatives. 5 7 The
Committee of the Regions (COR) is to offer advisory opinions to the
Council of Ministers on legislative proposals covering a specified
range of subjects.S The structure, functions and operation of the
COR offer a detailed view of both the potential and the limits of re-
gional participation in European institutions. Although it is still early
for a definitive evaluation of the COR's importance, some initial ob-
servations on the origins of the committee, its structure and functions,
and its potential and limits may be in order.
154. Treaty of Rome art 146.
155. EC TrATY art. 146.
156. Indeed, as noted above, the Belgian approach illustrates some of the limits of re-
gional participation. If regional representatives cannot agree on a joint position on issues
within exclusive regional competence, the Belgian government must abstain in the Council
of Ministers. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. An abstention, however, is not
neutral, but acts as a "no" vote, creating a drag on positive Community actions.
157. EC TREATY art. 198.
158. Axelrod, supra note 139, at 118.
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1. Origins
The impetus for proposals for a COR came from both within and
outside the Community institutions. For many years, the Commission,
as discussed above, sought to build a consultative regional grouping
that would serve as a sounding-board and implementation channel for
proposed and actual Commission policies, especially in the structural
funds area.15 9 The Consultative Council of Regions and Municipali-
ties created in 1988 served many of the Commission's goals, but left
the regions and their lobbying groups unsatisfied. For one thing, its
consultative functions depended entirely on the initiative of the Com-
mission. In the pre-Maastricht negotiations, the Commission sup-
ported a regional body, although noting that "the wide variety of
regional structures in the Member States precludes-and will proba-
bly continue to do so-the involvement of such a body in the decision-
making process.' 6 °
The European Parliament (EP), pushed by MEPs of regionalist
parties, also was a vocal supporter of a greater role for elected subna-
tional governments. The EP's 1988 Community Charter for Regional-
ization' 6' called for a greater role for regions. In the months leading
up to the Conference to discuss the EC Treaty, the EP passed resolu-
tions calling on the Member States to "ensure that the construction of
European Union goes hand-in-hand with a strengthening of regional
autonomy according to the principle of subsidiarity" 1'2 and for im-
proving the decision-taking capacity of the Council by creating a re-
gional body to "ensure the participation of the regions.11 6 3
The first proposals for a COR came from Germany, supported by
Denmark and Belgium. The Spanish and Italian governments showed
lukewarm support, while the French and British governments opposed
any new regional initiative.164 Eventually a majority of States and
159. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
160. EC Commission, Formal opinion pursuant to Article 236 of the EEC Treaty on the
proposal for amendment of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community
with a view to political union, Oct. 21, 1990, at Sec. III ("Strengthening democratic legiti-
macy"), reprinted in RicHARD CoRBETr, Tim TREATY OF MAASTRICHT: FROM CONCEP-
TION TO RATIFICATION: A CO MP1-NVE REFERENCE GUIDE 165, 169 (1993).
161. Community Charter for Regionalization, 1988 O.J. (C 326) 296 (annexed to Reso-
lution on Community regional policy and the role of regions, 1988 O.J. (C 326) 289).
162. Resolution on the Intergovernmental Conference decided on at the European
Council in Madrid, Nov. 23, 1989, at 7, reprinted in CORBETr, supra note 160, at 104, 105.
163. Resolution on the Intergovernmental Conference in the Context of Parliament's
Strategy for European Union (Martin II Report), July 11, 1990, at para. 22, reprinted in
CoRBETr, supra note 160, at 112, 116.
164. Pdrez Gonzalez, supra note 113, at 35-36.
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Community institutions agreed on the need for some kind of regional
consultative body. But several thorny issues remained. Debates re-
volved around: (1) the degree of independence of the new body from
the existing Economic and Social Committee; (2) its membership, in-
cluding the inclusion of local governments and of non-elected officials;
(3) the scope of its consultative powers and the required response to
its opinions; and (4) the ability of the COR to bring cases before the
ECJ. To a large degree, these same issues frame current discussions
about the COR's post-1996 role.
The independence of the Committee was an early source of con-
tention. One proposal envisioned the COR as a chamber of the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee (ESC),1 65 while the Commission
proposed enlarging the existing Consultative Committee.":' The re-
gional associations and the German government opposed these op-
tions, preferring a completely independent organ not linked to the
political and administrative fortunes of the ESC. The regions also
preferred a regions-only body, with a separate Committee for local
governments if necessary. They argued that local governments, espe-
cially urban ones, had different needs and viewpoints, and that their
inclusion in a single joint committee would reduce the cohesion and
effectiveness of a future COR. Many States disagreed, however,
pointing out that while some Member States have well-developed re-
gional or subnational structures, others have either no regional gov-
ernments or very weak ones, and that the only way to account for the
Member States' diversity was to include all levels of subnational gov-
ernment in a single body. This position eventually prevailed.' 67
The independence of the COR from central government officials
was also a priority of both the European Parliament and the regional
lobbying groups. They argued that only elected representatives could
help reduce the "democratic deficit," and especially objected to the
possibility, raised at one point by the UK, that appointed regional del-
egates of the central government could serve as COR members."'
The final proposal left the choice of members up to the Council of
165. See supra note 37 and accompanying text for a description of the Economic and
Social Committee.
166. Interview with Lut Fabert Goosens, DGXVI, European Commission, in Brussels,
Belgium (May 23, 1995).
167. Council Says Regions Representation Up to Member States, Reuter European Com-
munity Report, Apr. 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, ECNews File.
168. Regions Committee Should Be Elected MEPs Say, Reuter European Community
Report, Apr. 23, 1993, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, ECNews File.
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Ministers, based on proposals from the Member States. 169 Thus,
States are free to propose whomever they want as delegates, although
in practice States have rarely nominated unelected officials.'
70
Finally, the original German initiative gave the COR the right to
be consulted on issues related to regional development and regional
policy, and the option of providing an opinion on its own initiative in
other cases. The regional associations unsuccessfully tried to go fur-
ther, proposing mandatory consultation in all areas generally within
the domestic competence of regional authorities. The German draft
also provided that, where the Council or Commission acts against the
Committee's recommendation, they must justify their actions. 171 Most
controversial was the German proposal that the new committee have
standing before the European Court of Justice to challenge violations
of its right of consultation or of the principle of subsidiarity. Given
the reluctance of the Member States to concede that subsidiarity even
referred to the subnational level, this last provision was destined to
fail.
After several rounds of negotiations, a German-hRench-Spanish
joint proposal was submitted as part of the October 1991. draft. With a
few minor modifications, that proposal became the current Articles
198a-c of the Treaty of European Union.
2. Structure and functions
The COR is to provide advisory opinions to the Commission and
Council' 72 in five mandatory areas. These are: education and
youth,173 culture;174 public health;175 trans-European networks in the
169. Council Says Regions Representation Up to Member States, supra note 167.
170. The European Parliament, in a resolution generally supportive of the creation of
the COR, noted as a shortcoming of the results of the IGC the fact tiat the EC Treaty
"does not stipulate that members of the Committee of the Regions must be democratically
elected representatives of regional or local bodies." European Parliament Resolution on
the Results of the Intergovermental Conferences, Apr. 7, 1992, reprinted in CoRnErr,
supra note 162, at 484-85.
171. This is the case under German law; if the government departs from the position
approved by the Bundesrat during the course of negotiations in the Couicil of Ministers, it
must explain the reasons for such departure. See, e.g., Eduard Roig Moles, La Participa-
ci6n de los Entes Regionales: Una Perspectiva Comparada, 1 INFORME CONIUNIDADES
AUT6NOMAS 577, 587 (Instituto de Derecho Pdiblico, Barcelona, Spain 1995).
172. Several early proposals called for the Committee's opinions to be forwarded to the
Parliament. Although the final draft excludes any reference to the European Parliament,
in practice the Committee's opinions find their way to the Parliament as well. Interview
with Pedro Cervilla, COR Secretariat, in Brussels, Belgium (May 1995).
173. EC TREATY art. 126.
174. Id. art. 128.
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areas of transport; telecommunications and energy;176 and economic
and social cohesion, including the structural funds.177 In addition, it
may be consulted whenever the Commission or Council considers it
appropriate and may, on its own initiative, submit an opinion on any
other proposal which it believes has regional implications. 178 When-
ever the Economic and Social Committee is consulted, the COR shall
be informed and may, if it wishes, submit an opinion. These opinions
will be forwarded to the Community decision-makers together with
the opinion, if any, of the Economic and Social Committee.
The Committee is composed of 222 delegates and their alternates,
distributed by Member State in the same proportion as the Economic
and Social Committee, based on gross domestic product (GDP), pop-
ulation, and political weight.179 Members comprise both regional and
local authorities, the relative proportions to be determined by each
member state. While some states have few or no regional representa-
tives (Greece, Luxembourg, Ireland, Portugal), 80 others split their
delegations more or less evenly (France, Denmark, Italy, Nether-
lands). 181 Predictably, in those states with a greater degree of decen-
tralization, regional representatives predominate.'1  Members are
appointed for four-year renewable terms. They must not be bound by
mandatory instructions, and are independent in the performance of
their duties.
175. Id art. 129.
176. Id art. 129d.
177. Id art. 130a.
178. Id. art. 198c.
179. See P. Malaga Tello, El Comit de las Regiones de la Unidn Europea, 2402 BoLETi,
ECONOMICO DE INFORMACION COM.ERCIAL ESPANOLA 419 (1994). The distribution of
members parallels that of the Economic and Social Committee as follows: Belgium 12;
Ireland 9; Denmark 9; Italy 24; Germany 24; Ltembourg 6; Greece 12; Netherlands 12;
Spain 21; Portugal 12; France 24; United Kingdom 24; Austria 12; Finland 9; Sweden 12.
EC ThRATY art. 198(a).
180. Pdrez Gonzalez, supra note 113, at 46.
181. Denmark has 4 regional and 5 local representatives, Italy is split 13-11, Nether-
lands 6-6. and France 13-11. The United Kingdom, however, has 8 regional and 16 local
government members. Id.
182. Thus, Belgium has only regional representatives (although three local government
members are alternatives), Germany splits 21 regional and 3 local government representa-
tives, and Spain has representatives from each of 17 Autonomous Communities and 4 local
mayors. Id.
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Internally, the COR has a President, 8 3 a First Vice-President,
and a thirty-six member executive Bureau.' l  Eight Commissions and
three Sub-Commissions carry out the day-to-day work of analyzing
proposals and preparing opinions.'85 The COR's Bureau decides on
the need for an opinion (either own-initiative or required under the
EC Treaty) and on the appropriate Commission. At the Bureau, a
rapporteur is assigned to prepare a draft opinion, which is discussed
first in the relevant Commission(s) and finally debated by the full
COR.186 A sixty-person Secretariat, with some twenty professional
staff, assists the COR, often proposing areas for own-initiative opin-
ions. In practice, much of the routine preparatory work is done by the
regions and local governments themselves, although the Secretariat
plays an important role in advising on the selection of rapporteurs and
the drafting of opinions. 87 Technical services and a proportion of the
budget are shared with the Economic and Social Comrmittee. s8
3. The First Year of the COR
The COR's main business has been preparing and releasing opin-
ions. Of the more or less 100 opinions produced from its inception to
May 1995, almost half are own-initiative opinions, and slightly over
half are required by the EC Treaty. The own-initiative opinions range
from major questions of EU policy like the reform of the Common
183. The first president was Jacques Blanc, of the French Languedoc-Roussillon Re-
gional Council. He was succeeded by Pasqual Maragall, Mayor of Barcelona, Spain, the
current President. Malaga Tello, supra note 179.
184. Committee of the Regions Adopts Rules for Internal Elections, Reuter European
Community Report, Jan. 24, 1996, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, ECNews File. The
composition of the Bureau takes into account the geographical balance of the member
states. Id.
185. The Commissions are as follows: (1) Regional Development, Economic Develop-
ment, and Local and Regional Finances (Subcommission on Finances): (2) Spatial Plan-
ning, Agriculture, Hunting, Fisheries, Forestry, Marine Environment and Upland Areas;
(3) Transport and Communications Networks (Subcommission on Telecommunications);
(4) Urban Policies; (5) Land-use Planning, Environment and Energy; (6) Education and
Training, (7) Citizen's Europe, Research, Culture, Youth and Consumers (Subcommission
on Youth and Sport); and (8) Economic and Social Cohesion, Social Policy and Public
Health. There is also a Special Commission on Institutional Affairs, in charge of preparing
the COR's participation in the 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference. Committee of the
Regions, The Commissions of the Committee of the Regions (visited Mrr. 2,1997) <httpJ//
europa.eu.int/comreg/ccr.html>.
186. Interview with Pedro Cervilla, supra note 172.
187. Id.
188. As of April 1996, the COR took a step towards independence fom the ESC, set-
ting up separate offices. Committee of the Regions Changes Address, EUR. REP., Apr. 3,
1996.
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Agricultural Policy, White Papers on Social Policy," 9 and on Growth,
Competitiveness and Employment, 19 to opinions on telecommunica-
tions, bathing water quality and combating drug addiction. 1 1 While
most respond to a specific Commission proposal or program, a few
attempt a more proactive stance.192 Few of the opinions reject a Com-
mission proposal outright; most support the general thrust of propos-
als and propose amendments and additions.
Despite the variety of subjects covered, the overwhelming con-
stant in the opinions is the concern with subsidiarity, broadly defined.
On the one hand, this takes the form of defining the Committee's role
as the guardian of subsidiarity within the EU. The COR has tried to
establish its legitimacy and usefulness as representing the level of gov-
ernment closest to the ordinary citizen, tying its role to the solution of
the democratic deficit. For example, with respect to Commission
Green Papers (overall policy documents in a given sector), the Opin-
ion framed the Committee's contribution as asking questions for each
policy regarding the implications of the application of the subsidiarity
principle. The Opinion outlined questions as to whether the Commis-
sion has adequately taken account of the specificity of the regions, and
whether the proposals "will contribute to improving the ordinary lives
of European citizens and, therefore, make European integration more
tangible for them."193 The Committee "intends to pay particular at-
tention to this aspect in all of its Opinions."1 94
189. Commission of the European Communities: White Paper on European Social Pol-
icy, COM(94)333.
190. Commission of the European Communities: White Paper on Growth, Competi-
tiveness, and Employment, COM(93)700.
191. Opinion on "Towards the personal communications environment: Green Paper on
a Common Approach in the field of Mobile and Personal Communications in the Euro-
pean Union," 1995 O.J. (C 210) 5; Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Directive Con-
cerning the Quality of Bathing Water, 1995 O.J. (C 210) 7; Opinion on the Communication
from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament on a European Union Ac-
tion Plan to Combat Drugs, 1996 O.3. (C 100) 10.
192. See, eg., Opinion on the Effects of the Use of Bovine Somatotropin on Milk Pro-
duction in the Regions of the European Union, 1995 O.. (C 210) 15 (urging Council to
extend moratorium on BST until 2000).
193. Opinion on the Green Paper on Access of Consumers to Justice and the Settle-
ment of Consumer Disputes in the Single Market, 1994 O.. (C 217) 10. See also Blanca
Vila, El Comitg de las Regiones, 1994 INrorpm COmMUNIDADES AUT6NO oAs 499, 502
(Instituto de Derecho Ptiblico, Barcelona, Spain 1995). The Committee has expressed the
same idea in an opinion on the subsidiarity principle, discussed infra note 194 and accom-
panying text.
194. COR, Opinion on the Revision of the Treaty on the European Union and of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community, 1996 O.J. (C 100) 1, appendix (Supplemen-
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The COR's Opinions stress its insistence that regional and local
authorities are to be consulted, taken into account and involved in
policy formulation. Participation and consultation are the priorities;
only a few opinions view regional or local government participation in
terms of extra financial, legal or administrative burdens. 19 The intent
of the COR seems to be to serve as a constant reminder of the exist-
ence and importance of a "third level" of governance in EU-Member
State debates, as well as to assert its own relevance in Community
decision-making.
Related to the concern for subsidiarity and regional powers is the
COR's insistence on the importance of regional cultures, languages,
and heritage. For example, in its Opinion discussed above, on con-
sumers' access to justice, and again in its proposals to the Inter-Gov-
ernmental Conference, the Committee argued that diverse languages
and legal systems were not a negative factor, but an expression of the
rich cultural diversity of Europe.196 In opinions on cultural activities,
audiovisual policy, information policy, educational exchange and tour-
ism, the Committee has suggested better attention to regional diver-
sity as a strength of the Union. 97
In other areas, the Committee's output has been a mixed bag. Its
opinions on environment, for example, range from several seeking to
restrict Community control and allow a greater role for national, re-
gional and local authorities (on the bathing water directive, for exam-
ple) to others seeking greater attention to environmental criteria (for
example the BST Opinion or several opinions on the development of
trans-European networks). 98 The Committee has often pointed to
tary Opinion on the Application of the Principle of Subsidiarity in the European Union)
para. 8 [hereinafter COR Opinion on Revision of TEU].
195. This differs, for example, from the well-known debates over "unfunded mandates"
familiar to the state-federal balance in the United States.
196. See Opinion on a Policy for the Development of Rural Tourism in the Regions of
the European Union, 1995 O.J. (C 210) 17 (stating that such tourism should help preserve
the regional heritage); Opinion on the Green Paper on Strategy Options to Strengthen the
European Programme Industry in the Context of the Audiovisual Policy of the European
Union, 1995 OJ. (C 210) 4 (discussing the need for policy to promole the diversity of
regional cultures and lesser-used languages); Opinion on the Proposal for a European Par-
liament and Council Decision Establishing a Programme to Support Artistic and Cultural
Activities Having a European Dimension - Kaleidoscope 2000, 1996 O.J. (C100) 8.
197. Indeed, the Flemish government has proposed enshrining respect for cultural di-
versity and the cultural identity of each member state and each region in the common
principles of the EC Treaty. Flanders Government Adopts Proposals on 1GC, Reuters Eu-
ropean Community Report, May 20, 1996.
198. See Opinions on the Commission Communication to the European Parliament
and the Council on Community Guidelines on Trans-European Energy Networks, the Pro-
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the need for action to combat the negative effects of market-oriented
liberalization. 199
The Committee has also actively tried to focus the attention of
Community institutions on areas where it believes too little attention
has been paid to date. For example, the Committee issues recurrent
own-initiative opinions on employment issues, including new forms of
work, the effect on workers of relocation of international business,
territorial employment pacts, small and medium enterprises, workers'
rights upon transfer of businesses, and the link between work and ed-
ucation.2 °0 The issue clearly bears on the subject of economic and
social cohesion. Nevertheless, these initiatives seem to represent an
attempt by the Committee, or its Secretariat, to stake out a few areas
outside its formally narrow purview in which to develop a leadership
role vis-.-vis other Community institutions. This is similar to what the
European Parliament has done in the past.
The danger, of course, is that by opining on such a wide range of
subjects, the Committee will lose its focus and, eventually, any possi-
bility of influence. According to some Committee staff, this has been
the case with the sister Economic and Social Committee and thus a
fate to be avoided.20' In his own evaluation of the COR's first two
years, its President insisted that the "incisive, efficient style" of the
posal for a European Parliament and Council Decision Laying down a Series of Guidelines
on Trans-European Energy Networks, and the Proposal for a Council Decision Laying
Down a Series of Measures Aimed at Creating a More Favorable Contest for the Develop-
ment of Trans-European Networks in the Energy Sector, 1994 OJ. (C 217) 9; Opinion on
the Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) Laying Down the General Rules for the
Granting of Community Aid in the Field of Trans-European Networks, 1994 OJ. (C 217)
12; Opinion of the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Decision on Commu-
nity Guidelines for the Development of the Trans-European Transport Network, 1995 O.
(C 210) 2.
199. See, eg., Opinion on The Regional Consequences of the Common Agricultural
Policy Reform, 1996 OJ. (C 129) 4; Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Resolution on
the Common Organization of the Market in Fruits and Vegetables, 1996 OJ. (C 129) 5;
Opinion on the Communication from the Commission Concerning the Promotion of En-
ergy Efficiency in the European Union (SAVE II Programme), 1996 OJ. (C 129) S.
200. See Opinion on the Vhite Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment:
"The Challenges and Vays Forward into the 21st Century," 1995 OJ. (C 210) 1 (Commis-
sion should analyze impact of structural economic changes and worker incentive schemes);
Opinion on the white Paper on European Social Policy:. "A Way Forward for the Union,"
1995 OJ. (C 210) 10 (Commission should research new forms of work, including job shar-
ing and splitting, flextime, seasonal work and telecommuting); Vila, supra note 193, at 507.
201. Interview with Pedro Cervilla, supra note 172; interview with Winnie Bang Peter-
sen, COR Secretariat, in Brussels, Belgium (May 1995).
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opinions meant "there will be no risk of them being too thinly spread
over subjects outside the remit of local and regional authorities."2 °
Still, in an attempt to focus the Committee's efforts as well as
ensure timely and well-researched input into the relevant decisions, in
April 1995 the COR and the European Commission agreed on criteria
for non-obligatory opinions. The Commission presented a work plan
of Commission activity for 1995 where it believed the COR would
need to opine. The COR will emit opinions on (1) those actions that
require the participation of territorial collectivities (i.e. regional and
local authorities) for their implementation; (2) those actions that di-
rectly affect territorial collectivities; (3) those actions which may have
consequences in matters of cohesion; and (4) those documents trans-
mitted to allow the Committee to prepare its position in the major
debates before the Union.2" 3 The Commission lists the specific pro-
grams within these criteria where it expects to emit proposals or other
documents over the year.204
The drafting of a joint work plan is emblematic of the Commis-
sion's efforts to help the new Committee find a clear role. The Com-
mission has been the strongest supporter of the COR within the
European Union institutions, maintaining regular conlacts at several
levels.205 Commission representatives regularly attend COR sessions
and respond to criticisms. The Commission has been generally sup-
portive of attempts by the COR to bolster its powers, possibly seeing a
strong regional presence as a useful counterweight to national
governments.
20 6
202. Jacques Blanc, The Committee of the Regions' Contribution to European Integra-
tion: Impact of Opinions, Jan. 18, 1996 (visited Feb. 28, 1997) <http:J/europa.eu.intcomreg/
iofoen.html>.
203. The fourth category seems to be a catch-all for communications, reports, and other
non-legislative proposals within the COR's general competence as well as White Papers
and general debate documents. For example, communications on the structural funds and
on education are listed here. Programme Previsionnel des Saisines du Comit6 des Regions
Soumis par la Commission pour 1995, annex I, Apr. 18, 1995 (author's translation from
French).
204. In the nonmandatory area, these include employment and sozial policy, energy,
environment, training, telecommunications and information society, sports, tourism, trans-
port, civil protection, land use, audiovisual policy, industrial competitiveness, fisheries, re-
search and development, completion of the internal market, postal services, and
Mediterranean policy. Id.
205. Contacts exist at the commissioner level, with the commissioner in charge of re-
gional policy, through a liaison on management matters, and through each directorate gen-
eral. Interview with Pedro Cervilla, supra note 172.
206. See James Kellas, European Integration and the Regions, 44 PARLIAMENTARY AlT.
226, 235 (1991) (EC Commissioners may be natural allies of regions.).
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The COR's relations with the European Parliament have been
more ambivalent. As mentioned, the European Parliament was an
early and consistent supporter of greater regional participation in EU
affairs. Both institutions exist to bring the EU closer to the citizens,
and to that extent they are allies against the Council of Ministers. On
the other hand, the higher internal (and sometimes international) pro-
file of regional political leaders, who often wield power (and represent
constituencies) in their respective states far exceeding that of an MEP,
creates certain jealousies and tensions. Thus, in certain instances par-
liamentary committees have declined to use COR studies or to ask for
or take into account the COR's opinions.20 7 It remains to be seen how
strongly the Parliament will continue to support regional participation
in the current IGC.
To evaluate the COR's potential as an instrument for democrati-
zation and regional participation in community politics, some atten-
tion is due its internal dynamics. The varied and hybrid nature of the
Committee in several respects makes these dynamics complex and
may make it more difficult for the Committee to play the political role
it seems to seek within the Community.
First, the wide disparity in the competences of regional authori-
ties within the different member states makes it hard for the Commit-
tee to take a unified position. While in some states regional and local
authorities simply reproduce the positions and viewpoints of the cen-
tral government, in others they have a distinct agenda. Thus, for most
issues, the main source of agreement for the Committee's members is
the need to be consulted and taken into account. Beyond that, the
North-South divisions within the Council of Ministers tend largely to
be reproduced. One exception to this general rule arises where re-
gions within member states are themselves divided along economic
lines.2 °s In addition to North-South splits, the Committee also divides
207. Although as noted these Opinions are not required by the Treaty to be circulated
to the European Parliament, in practice they circulate widely. Interview with Alain
Crespinet, COR Secretariat, in Brussels, Belgium (May 1995); Interview with Pedro
Cervilla, supra note 172.
208. The best example comes from the debate over the market in wines, perhaps the
most controversial issue taken up by the COR in 1994. An initial Commission proposal
would have resulted in the pulling up of thousands of acres of vineyards, mostly in Spain
and Italy, and would have favored Northern (especially German) producers who use more
intensive cultivation methods and add sugar to boost the potency of their wine. Proposal
for a Council Regulation (EC) on Reform of the Common Organization of the Market in
Wine, COM(94)117 final. The COR's draft Opinion provided detailed and reasoned oppo-
sition to the proposal, alternative proposals for bringing supply and demand into line, a
plea for taking into account the "special circumstances of the poorer and less productive
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along ideological lines, especially around questions of social and labor
policy; however, formal party blocs like those of the European Parlia-
ment have not materialized to date.20 9 Regionalist or nationalist par-
ties are, as expected, among the most active representatives on the
COR.
In contrast, despite the expressed fears of AER and other re-
gional advocates, significant differences between regions on the one
hand and local or municipal authorities on the other, or differences
along rural-urban lines, have been less salient.
It is difficult to judge the effectiveness of the COR as a political
body. A number of its Opinions have resulted in changes to Commis-
sion proposals or Council decisions, mostly those referring to adminis-
tration of the structural funds or to issues of regional participation.2 10
Analysis by the outgoing President of the COR found that forty of
seventy-four opinions produced some change in Commission or Coun-
cil proposals, guidelines or commitments or influenced final docu-
ments.2 ' In several cases, Committee opinions have resulted in
conferences, specific programs or increases in funding in specific ar-
regions" and coordination of wine policy with structural policy and with CAP reforms os-
tensibly aimed at keeping farmers on the land. It was, in short, a ringing endorsement of
the "Southern" position, especially that of Spain. Opinion on the Proposal for a Council
Regulation (EC) on Reform of the Common Organization of the Market in Wine, 1995
0.. (C 210) 9.
The full COR, predictably, divided along North-South lines. However, regions in
southern France voted with the Spanish and Italian regions, while northern French regions
supported the German position. Germany's traditional allies in the Ccuncil of Ministers
were, in the COR, not interested in the issue, while Irish authorities voted with the South-
ern bloc. Thus, the balance of forces shifted slightly from what it would have been in the
Council, and by majority vote, after several tries, the Opinion was approved. Id.
209. Interview with Pedro Cervilla, supra note 172; interview with Alain Crespinet,
supra note 207.
210. Vila, supra note 193, at 509-10. For example, in the wake of the Committee's
Opinion on the Proposal for a Regulation (EC) Establishing a Cohesion Fund, 1994 O.J.
(C 217) 1, the Council added a provision on the participation of regional and local authori-
ties in the monitoring committees. The Commission revised a proposal on the moderniza-
tion of the Portuguese textile sector to include regional and local authorities in the
preparation and implementation phases after the Committee suggested language to that
effect. Opinion on the Community Initiative on the Modernization of the Textile and
Clothing Industry of Portugal, 1994 O.J. (C 217) 4. However, the COR also proposed that
it be consulted periodically on the local and regional effects of Community initiatives
within the structural funds framework, but the proposal was rejected. Compare The Future
of Community Initiatives Under the Structural Funds, COM(94)46 final, with Opinion on
the Future of Community Initiatives Under the Structural Funds, 1994 O.J. (C 217) 2.
211. Blanc, supra note 202.
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eas.212 On the other hand, repeated suggestions to include regional
representatives or the COR in Community-level policy committees
have not been heeded.
213
Of course, it is not easy to know how many of these changes
would have occurred simply based on informal lobbying by regions,
even in the absence of a formal Committee.214 To date, much of the
COR's clout arises from the vocal participation of well-known elected
regional politicians who can make life difficult for their national gov-
ernments if they so choose. If these major political figures, people
such as the Presidents of Cataluyna, Baden-Wiirttenburg or Flanders,
lose interest, the COR may fade. Moreover, those regions that won
the right to formal participation at the Council or Permanent Repre-
sentative level may focus their energies there, rather than strengthen-
ing the merely consultative role of the COR.21 5 Perhaps the most
difficult task for the COR will be forging an identity-one that goes
beyond mere calls for more power-among regions and local govern-
ments with vastly different roles within their national contexts.
V. The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and the
Regional Perspective
Article N of the 1992 EC Treaty stipulates that an Intergovern-
mental Conference shall be convened in 1996 to examine and possibly
revise certain Treaty provisions. The examination was considered nec-
essary due in part to substantial opposition within Europe to the
Treaty as well as to an awareness that the Union might shortly be
expanded to twenty-five or more states.216 As part of the preparatory
process, a Reflection Group was created to consider reports from the
Commission, the Parliament and other EU bodies on possible institu-
tional reforms. The main issues on the agenda include monetary
union, the feasibility of a "two-track" or "Europe-a-la-carte" ap-
212. For example, the Committee's suggestions resulted in a conference on combating
drugs, in a specific Community initiative on training (ADAPT-BIS) and in strengthening
other Community initiatives and in numerous changes to final proposals of the Commis-
sion. Blanc, supra note 202. Several proposals were subsequently taken up by the Euro-
pean Parliament. Id.
213. Id
214. Interview with Joaquin Llimona, Generalitat de Catalonia, in Barcelona, Spain
(Sept. 1995).
215. According to Pedro Cervilla of the COR Secretariat, this is already the case with
Belgian representatives. Interview wvith Pedro Cervilla, supra note 172.
216. See David O'Keeffe, Blaine Sloan Lecture Current Issues in European Integration,
7 PACE INTL L. REv. 1 (1995).
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proach, shoring up the foreign policy and justice "pillars" of the union,
and a possible reallocation of seats on the Commission and the Coun-
cil to accommodate new members.217 Although the "democratic dei-
cit" remains an urgent subject of discussion, discussions have centered
on proposals to increase the powers of the European Parliament and
to involve national parliaments more closely in the decision making
process.218 In the debate so far, the voice of the regions has not yet
resonated loudly. Nonetheless, the Conference agenda calls for dis-
cussing the place of regions in Europe. For the first time, regional
governments will take part.
Increased attention to the potential role of regions might help
solve some of the dilemmas of legitimacy in the Community struc-
tures, but may also raise new problems. The COR and a number of
academics and policymakers have put forward proposals ranging from
a second, territorial-based chamber of the Parliament to a modest ex-
pansion in the scope of the COR's consultative function. While the
first seems unlikely in the current political climate, the latter may very
well be achieved in 1997.
The COR itself, supported by organizations like the AER, has
focused its efforts on two areas: redefining the meaning and role of
"subsidiarity," and gaining access to the Court of Justice.2 1 9 As dis-
cussed above, Article 3b of the EC Treaty establishes subsidiarity as
the principle that the Union should only act when member states can-
not do so more effectively. 220 The Committee recognizes that, as cur-
rently applied, subsidiarity refers only to relations between the EU
217. Id.
218. Mr. Pujol Welcomes Participation of Representatives of the Regions, Agence Eu-
rope, Apr. 2, 1996, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, ECNews File. The Parliament
wants parity with the Council of Ministers in co-decision and coopeation procedures,
more control over the budget and the right to assent to revision of Union Treaties and all
international treaties. Some representatives are also pushing for changes in the method of
election of MEPs, while France and the United Kingdom have been the champions of a
greater role for national parliaments. Id.
219. COR Opinion on Revision of TEU, supra note 194, Explanatory Memorandum.
In addition, the COR requests an expansion of the areas where consultation is mandatory
to include agriculture, transport, social policy, research and technological development,
vocations training, environmental protection, industry, energy, and consumer protections.
It also proposes to revisit earlier proposals for EC institutions to justify ,any disagreements
with the Committee's opinion, for representatives to be appointed on the recommendation
of elected regional and local bodies, and for total separation from the Economic and Social
Committee. Id.
220. See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text.
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and Member States. 2 ' The Committee proposes rewording the sec-
ond paragraph of Article 3b to explicitly refer to regional and local
authorities:
The Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle
of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, or by
the regional and local authorities endowed with powers tinder the do-
mestic legislation of the Member State in question.t-
Thus, Article 3b would serve "not only as a criterion for exercis-
ing shared powers between the Union and the Member States, but
also as a criterion for sharing powers and responsibilities among all
levels of government participating in the European Union."2 By fo-
cusing only on limits to the Community's authority, and not on that of
the states themselves, this formulation avoids the inconvenient fact of
widely varying degrees of regional and local government power, and
the potential accusation that Treaty reform is indirectly changing the
internal structures of member states. 4
In addition, the COR, based on a proposal from the German
Lander, also calls for listing the respective powers of the Union and of
Member States to establish a clear demarcation and facilitate applica-
221. However, a concurrent Supplementary Opinion of the COR on the Application of
the Principle of Subsidiarity in the European Union points out that Article 3b "does not
refer exclusively to the central organs of the state," so that there is no legal impediment to
expanding the understood meaning of the term. COR, Opinion on the Resision of the
TEU, supra note 194, appendix, para. F.
222. 1&
223. Id. Explanatory Memorandum.
224. The Committee broadly supports the approach of the Edinburgh Council of De-
cember 1992, which established guidelines for the exercise of the subsidiarity principle, as
well as the Commission's review of existing legislation. The COR proposes a greater COR
role in advising on the subsidiarity implications of proposed EU legislation and in monitor-
ing observance of the principle. COR Opinion on the Revision of TEU, supra note 194,
appendix, paras. 4-9. Thus, the COR "considers, in keeping with the principle of sub-
sidiarity, which shared competences between the Community and the Member States
should be exercised at as decentralized an administrative level as possible, taking into ac-
count the competences of the regions and local authorities, as well as the political and
administrative structures of the Member States, and consistently satisfying criteria of suita-
bility and efficiency." Id. para. 11. Likewise,
[w]hereas in parallel with the process of European integration, Member States
have seen radical changes in the territorial distribution of power, crstallizing in
some Member States in a federal or highly regionalized structure and, in other
Member States in a growing tendency to decentralization; [and wihereas a reor-
ganization of administrative structures along these lines must inevitably lead to a
more efficient and more democratic administrative system ....
Id. paras. B & C.
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tion of the subsidiarity principle by the Court of Justice, among
others.2-5 While such listing might increase transparency, it would
probably be difficult to agree on. If the list were minimal, it would act
as a brake on the process of Community law-making; an expansive
approach to listing competences, on the other hand, would no doubt
run into objections from the United Kingdom at least. The proposal is
therefore vulnerable to attack from both pro- and anti-Union forces.
Another route to a greater role for the regions would be to in-
crease the power of the COR. Most sweepingly, the Committee's con-
sultative function could be transformed into a mandatory assent
procedure. Some "Europe of the Regions" visionarie,3, recalling the
limited powers initially accorded to the European Parliament, have
suggested some version of this approach. 6 However, the dominant
sense among politicians and policymakers is that stil[ more institu-
tional complexity would be disastrous, and that the political climate is
not propitious for major structural reforms, especially reform as con-
tentious as this would be.
An alternative way to upgrade the COR's powers within the cur-
rent institutional framework would be to enhance its ability to bring
complaints before the European Court of Justice. z7 There are essen-
tially two versions of this approach presently on the t:able: one that
affects only the prerogatives of the Committee itself and a more ambi-
tious one that would enshrine the COR as the guardian of the sub-
sidiarity principle.
Under the first approach, the COR, like the European Parlia-
ment and Central Bank, would be able to bring actions under Article
173 to annul illegal Community acts that infringe on its prerogatives.
As it now stands, Article 173 gives the Commission, Council and
Member States a general right to bring actions, while other natural or
legal persons must show that a legal act affects them directly and indi-
vidually-a narrow standing test that the COR would be unlikely to
225. Interview with Pedro Cervilla, supra note 172.
226. See generally Jeffrey Anderson, Skeptical Reflections on a Europe of Regions Brit.
ain, Germany, and the ERDF, 10 J. PuB. PoL'Y 417 (1991).
227. Early proposals for a Committee of Regions included provisions granting the COR
the ability to bring annulment proceedings under Article 173 of the Treaty of Rome in
cases where either its prerogatives or the principle of subsidiarity were abridged. One
example of this is the Assembly of European Regions, proposal of December 5-6, 1990,
later adopted by the German government. P6rez Gonzalez, supra note 113, at 34-35.
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meet. The European Parliament has expressed support for this
approach.22
Second, and in a similar vein, the COR would be able to bring
proceedings under Article 175 for failure to act. Thus, for example, if
the Council and Commission enacted legislation in an area within the
Committee's advisory jurisdiction without having first forwarded the
proposal to it for an Opinion, the Committee would have standing to
challenge the legislation 229 More ambitiously, the COR proposes
ECJ jurisdiction over actions "brought by the Committee of the Re-
gions against violations of the principle of subsidiarity, and in actions
brought by the regions whose legislative powers may be affected by a
regulation, directive or decision." 2 0 Thus, the COR would legally be-
come a guardian of the subsidiarity clause in the treaty, able to sue
when it believes a Community action could, according to Article 3b,
have better been taken at a lower level (or, presumably, if the Com-
munity failed to act where Community action was required under the
subsidiarity criteria).2 1 Even assuming that Member States would be
able to bring such an action (Le., that the debate over the justiciability
of subsidiarity is resolved positively), acceptance of the Committee's
jurisdiction would embroil the ECJ in another whole layer of debate
over the appropriateness and proportionality of action, with the at-
tendant dangers of legislative paralysis. To an even greater extent, the
228. Committee of the Regions!European Parliament Conference, The IGC at tie Cen-
tre of Discussions, Brussels, Oct. 3, 1996 (visited on Mar. 1, 1997) <http:i/europa.eu.int
comregpr96107en.html>.
229. Two possible avenues would obtain this result in the case of Article 175. One is to
amend that article to specifically include the Committee of the Regions among those who
may bring an action. The other is to upgrade the COR's status to that of an -institution."
As such, it could bring actions under the current wording of Article 175, wvhich pe"rmits the
Member States and the other institutions of the Community to bring infringement actions.
Under this variant, Article 4 of the EC Treaty would read:
1. The tasks entrusted to the Community shall be carried out by the follo%%ing
institutions:
a European Parliament, a Council, a Commission, a Court of Justice, a Court
of Auditors, a Committee of the Regions.
Each institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by
this Treaty.
2. The Council and the Commission shall be assisted by an Economic and Social
Committee acting in an advisory capacity.
COR Opinion on the Revision of the TEU, supra note 194, at para. 4. In this context, it is
interesting to note that the Court of Auditors only became an "institution" in the 1992 EC
Treaty. ARcH-R, supra note 37, at 117.
230. COR Opinion on Revision of TEU, supra note 194, at para. 2.
231. See Conclusions of Dec. 11-12 Edinburgh Summit, supra note 141 and accompany-
ing text.
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proposal to extend standing to regions whose legislative powers may
be affected by Commission or Council action would potentially un-
leash a torrent of new litigation.2 32 As such, the proposal is unlikely
to prosper in the short term.
On the other hand, a series of more modest proposals will proba-
bly win some acceptance. These include expanding the COR's advi-
sory responsibilities to include consultation by the European
Parliament, expanding the scope of mandatory consultations to other
subject areas, ensuring that members of the Committee are elected or
politically accountable to an elected body, and establi,;hing adminis-
trative and budgetary independence from the Economic and Social
Committee. 23
So far, these predictions have been borne out. As part of the
preparatory process, a Reflection Group headed by the Spanish For-
eign Minister considered reports from the Commission, the Parlia-
ment and other EU bodies on possible institutional reforms. The
Reflection Group's Report is to form the basis for negotiations on
treaty modification, which in 1996.234 The Group underlined the im-
portance of the COR, but affirmed that because of its recent origins it
made sense to give the Committee time to establish itself fully before
expanding its functions.235 While sympathetic to some of the COR's
concerns on its administrative independence and on t:he European
Parliament's ability to consult, the Reflection Group declined to en-
dorse the Committee's views on establishing a catalogue of rights or
on the definition of subsidiarity.236 According to the Reflection
Group's report, a large majority felt that it was not the Committee's
role to interpret the subsidiarity principle in cases of shared compe-
tences between the Union and the Member States. 37
232. In decentralized states, disputes over the effects of central government actions on
the legislative competences of subnational entities have occupied constitutional courts for
quite some time. See generally ArroTNi CHOY I TARRES, LA CONLI cIrVIrAT CONI.
PETENCIAL: MEDI ABLmNrr (1994) (citing numerous clashes between central government
and Spanish autonomous communities regarding division of competences).
233. Committee of the Regions, Declaration of the Committee of the Regions for the
Intergovernmental Conference, (visited Mar. 1, 1997) <http://europa.ei.intlcomreg/decl-
en.html>.
234. There is some concern that negotiations are dragging and that the original timeta-
ble, which runs until June 1997, may not be long enough. See Committee of the Regions/
European Parliament Conference, supra note 228.
235. INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE OF 1996, REPORT OF "HE REFLECrION
GROUP AND OTHER DOCUMENTs, SECRETARIAT GENERAL, COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION, BRUSSELS, DEC. 1995, at para. 123 (translation by author from the French).
236. Id.
237. Id. paras. 71, 123, 125.
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VI. Evaluation: Possible Roles for the Regions
The arguments for strengthening the regional voice in European
Union institutions vary depending on the underlying rationales.
There are at least three possibilities. First, an increased role for re-
gional and local governments could help solve Europe's continuing
democratic deficit, allowing the elected officials closest to the grass-
roots access to decision-making. This would allow a wider range of
political voices to be heard, especially from regionalist or nationalist
parties unable to command nationwide majorities but still representa-
tive of a significant portion of the electorate. Similarly, the presence
of local authorities opens up at least the consultative process to forces
on the right and left who are less likely to win nationwide votes.
This rationale would place local officials, who are presumably
closest to the complaints and aspirations of citizens, at the same or
even higher level than regional officials, who are farther away. It as-
sumes that regional and local officials will in reality be democratically
elected and will best transmit the real grassroots concerns of everyday
citizens. This may in some cases be true, but in others local officials
may be tied into national political machinations or otherwise less than
fully representative of the concerns of their constituents.
Moreover, those minorities, peoples, and groups who are not ter-
ritorially-based, or who are too weak economically or politically to
capture local governments, will continue without direct representa-
tion. If the aim is greater representation, it seems illogical to limit
such representation to regional governments. Rather, a strengthened
Economic and Social Committee, as well as enhanced roles for the
other institutions of civil society, including NGOs, consumer groups,
small business associations and others, would be required.
A variant on this approach would focus not on all regions, but on
the subset of regions that have a "consciousness of nationhood."2' ::
Increasing powers for regions would serve to bind these regions di-
rectly into the European project, allowing them some independent
voice without challenging the primacy of existing states. To a large
extent, these are the regions which play a leading role in the Commit-
tee on Regions and have pushed hard for wider powers for regional
institutions. Thus, wider powers for regions qua regions would be un-
necessary if we could devise a way of distinguishing the Basques,
Scots, Flemish, Corsicans and Catalonians from others without unac-
ceptable impingements on concepts of national unity and sovereignty;
238. Santiago Petchen, Address at the Spanish Parliament (1995).
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to date we cannot, so we talk about wider roles for regions in general.
Under this argument, we should focus instead on defining markers of
conscious nationhood-Petchen suggests the persistence of nationalist
regional political parties in the European Parliament--and focus ef-
forts on incorporation of just those regions, abandoning the larger
project.
Two other potential rationales suggest themselves. From both an
administrative efficiency and an equity point of view, increased re-
gional representation facilitates the implementation of European pol-
icy initiatives and alleviates the perceived injustice of EU policy
"invading" the prerogatives of regional governments. If regions are to
be primarily responsible for implementation of Directives and Regu-
lations, greater input to the policy-making process should result, at the
least, in a greater sense of ownership of the final product. Moreover,
from the point of view of both the Commission and the Parliament, a
greater regional role could help balance the power of national govern-
ments. Under this rationale, only those regional governments with
significant legislative responsibilities under national law need be in-
volved, and access to information seems the primary need. A consult-
ative role combined with procedural safeguards to ensure adequate
information and the ability to voice objections during policy formula-
tion would seem the most useful.
A final rationale focuses at the national and local, not European
level. An enhanced role for regions serves as a bridge between far-off
Brussels and the local government where the citizenry is most likely to
interact, investing local governments in the European project. It also
raises the profile of regional governments at the national level and
may facilitate demands towards greater decentralization within na-
tional polities. This rationale starts from a belief that greater regional-
ization and decentralization are desirable, and looks to an enhanced
regional role in Europe as a means towards that end. Although cur-
rent arrangements are obviously insufficient, they set in motion a pro-
cess which, over time, may lead to a greater preeminence of the
regional model. Of course, this rationale often remains unstated, as it
conflicts with the mantra of noninterference in domestic legal
arrangements.
VII. Conclusion
As the European Union looks to expand beyond its current fif-
teen members to twenty or more, granting a more forraal role to re-
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gional and local governments may prove attractive. Several Eastern
European states have significant ethnic minorities and are moving to-
wards greater local and regional autonomy, in part in response to in-
ternational concern for peaceful resolution of minority rights issues.2 9
Some form of participation in European institutions may again prove
a necessary balance to the transfer of newly-won regional powers to
what will no doubt appear an even more remote Brussels' bureau-
cracy. If that is the case, one or more of these rationales may serve to
buttress their arguments. But the design of future measures depends
heavily on which, or which combination of, discourse underlies any
such proposal. Some additional thinking about justifications and ra-
tionales may be a necessary step before regional power in the EU can
move forward.
239. See generally Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Budapest
Summit Declaration on Genuine Partnership in a New Era, Dec. 6, 1994, 34 LL.M. 764,
767, 798.

